A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor by Weber, Mark C.
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CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT: IMPROVING
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MARK C. WEBER*
This Article contends that class actions with preclusive effect should not be
settled unless the court gives all class members the option to reject the settlement
and exclude themselves from the class at the time of the offer. The only exception
should be those actions in which the problems of class members holding out their
agreement would be insurmountable, cases involving a limited fund or the
equivalent.
The Article criticizes the recent decision Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, in which the Supreme Court overturned the settlement of a mass tort
class action on the ground that the case failed to meet the standards in the
federal class action rule concerning predominance of common issues and
adequacy of representation. The Court's heightened attention to predominance
and representative adequacy will bar desirable class action litigation and
settlements, but does not afford what would actually be of use to the class
members: the ability to make their own personal decisions about whether a
proposed class action settlement is acceptable to them.
This choice to accept or refuse settlement is the one most closely
comparable to that which non-class action litigants exercise. Moreover, no one
else can make this choice for the individual class member: a decision made by a
class representative or a court will neither uphold the class member's personal
freedom of decision nor accommodate the individual'spreferences for risk
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I. INTRODUCTION
Like most other cases, most class actions settle.1 Unlike most settlements,
class action settlements raise serious questions about the true willingness of all the
parties to compromise their legal claims. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,2
the Supreme Court overturned the settlement of a mass tort class action on the
ground that the case failed to meet the standards in the class action rule
concerning predominance of common issues and adequacy of representation.3
The class had been certified for purposes of settlement only, and consisted of
I A recent, comprehensive study of class action litigation in four federal districts indicated
that settlement rates for each district for non-prisoner class actions were within 16% above or
below the settlement rates of the districts for non-prisoner cases that were not class actions; the
rate of trial in class actions was close to that of non-class actions-in the single digits in all
districts for both class actions and other civil cases. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical
Analysis ofRule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 92 (1996).
2 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2235-36 (1997).
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if... (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ("An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:... (3) the court finds that the questions of fact or law common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ... ').
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individuals who had been exposed to the defendants' asbestos but who had not
filed suit.4 All manners of injured, latently injured, and non-injured persons were
included.5 The settlement afforded a fixed schedule of damages based on various
manifest, direct injuries, subject to limited individualized review and a practical
prohibition on the ability to use ordinary tort adjudication for the claims.6 Written
notice, with the right to opt out of the settlement, was ultimately afforded to 6.8
million people7 in a class that might have included twenty to thirty millions
members; the notice was supplemented by extensive publicity efforts.9
Although legitimate controversy exists on the issues that led to the Court's
rejection of the Amchem settlement-predominance of common issues and
representative adequacy-the showing the parties made on these subjects was no
weaker than that in many class actions that have reached conclusions widely
regarded as successful.10 The Supreme Court's new, heightened attention to
predominance and representative adequacy is likely to bar useful class action
litigation and settlements.'1
At the same time, the decision fails to recognize an alternative approach:
requiring individual class member consent in class action settlements. What
Anchem did not afford is what the class members actually need: the ability to
make their own personal decisions about whether a proposed class action
settlement is acceptable to them. It is this choice, made with adequate information
at a meaningful time, that is most closely comparable to the choice that non-class
action litigants make. 12 Moreover, it is this choice that no one else can make for
4 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2239-40 n.5.
5 See id at 2240.
6 See id at 2240-41.
7 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RtD. 246, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing
estimates from Final Notice Report), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
8 See id at 325. The Court found that the exact size of the class was unknown. See id. at
261. The Third Circuit declared that the class was between 250,000 and 2,000,000, but the basis
for this count is not clear from the opinion. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
617 (3d Cir. 1996).
9 See Georgine, 157 F.RID. at 312.
10 See infra notes 163-86 and accompanying text.
11 A telling example of how the Court's approach may bar desirable agreements is the
silicone gel breast implant litigation, which nearly settled in 1996. See In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept 1, 1994)
(approving settlement terms). The breast implant litigation had many of the same weaknesses of
predominance of common issues and representative adequacy that Amchem had, but the breast
implant settlement featured meaningful notice and afforded opt-out rights to all those whose
cause of action was to have been foreclosed, id at *2-4 (notice), *11 (opt out and final
approval), and thus was little different from the agreed resolution of any individual case at an
early stage of factual and legal development. See infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 202-04,232 and accompanying text.
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the individual class member, for a decision made by a class representative or a
court will neither uphold the class member's personal freedom of decision nor
accommodate the individual's preferences for risk.13 If a class member chooses
not to settle, that individual ought to be afforded the further choice to sue
individually or to start an independent class action comprising all persons
dissatisfied with the settlement offer.
Individual choice to settle or to opt out at the time of settlement does not
completely substitute for the other safeguards found in Rule 23, including the
predominance and representative adequacy requirements. But while it is far more
important than either of those requirements, it is nowhere explicitly required by
Rule 23. The only individual choice required by Rule 23 is the ability to opt out at
the time of certification, and even that right is not afforded in all class actions. 14
In this Article, I contend that class actions with preclusive effects should not
be settled unless the court gives all class members the option to reject the
settlement and exclude themselves from the class at the time of the offer. The
only exception should be those actions in which the problems of class members
holding out their agreement would be insurmountable: cases involving a limited
fund or the equivalent. 15 In cases in which a meaningful choice to accept or reject
the settlement is afforded, predominance and representative adequacy standards
may be relaxed sufficiently so that a wider range of cases can be adjudicated
economically by the class action device. 16
In line with this view of class action settlement, the Supreme Court was
correct to vacate the Amchem settlement, but not because of a lack of
13 See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
14 The right to opt out of the class at the time of class certification is afforded only in class
actions brought under subdivision (b)(3) of the federal class action rule. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b), 23(c)(3).
15 These cases are designated subdivision (b)(1) class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
16 The approach advocated here applies not only to class actions in federal court, but also
to class actions in state court. Personal autonomy and individual preferences are considerations
in state court just as they are in federal court, and dictate a right to individual consent before
settlement. Because most states' class action rules or statutes are identical to Federal Rule 23,
this Article uses the federal categories and terminology. States whose laws are different should
apply the same principles under their own statutes and rules; the typical non-replica laws do not
differ much from the Federal Rule. For discussions of class actions in state court, see
ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, MANAGING MASS TORT CASES: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR STATE TRIAL
COURT JUDGES, ch. 12 (1995); ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY COMMITTEE ON
COMPLEX LITIGATION, ILLINOIS MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, ch. 9 (3d ed. 1997); Mark
C. Weber, Managing Complex Litigation in the illinois Courts, 27 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 959
(1996). Far from wishing to denigrate the role of state courts in resolving complex cases such as
class actions, I have proposed that state courts should be the forum of choice in class actions
and other consolidated proceedings involving mass disasters and dispersed product injuries. See
Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical
Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 215,255 (1994) [hereinafter Weber, State Courts].
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predominance of the common issues or because of inadequate representation.
Instead, the failing was that the class included persons who had no reason to
know of or to be concerned about their potential injuries. The reason the failing
mattered was that those class members were unable to receive meaningful notice,
and were therefore unable to make sensible individual decisions whether to accept
or reject the settlement.
The last decade has seen a mushrooming of class action scholarship as courts
have explored the use of class actions in asbestos and other mass tort cases.
Though commentators have either extolled 17 or protested 18 the use of class
actions in these cases and have either praised 19 or decried2° existing practices
17 See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1043-45 (1986) (proposing federal mass tort procedure
act as means for dealing with nationwide mass-tort litigation crisis); David Rosenberg, Class
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.i 561, 568
(1987) (calling for aggregative remedies in mass tort litigation to maintain the distributional
fairness implicit in the notion of individual fairness); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. LA. L.
REv. 79, 83 (1997) (proposing aggregated solutions as best method for resolving mass tort
claims). But see Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14
REv. LrMG. 79, 87, 104-05 (1994) (adding reservations).
18 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1350 (1995) (arguing that mass tort class action has increasingly
become a shield for defendants); Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A
Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 69 (challenging group treatment of cases at disposition
phase); Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
779, 816-31 (1985) (discussing disadvantages of class action treatment of mass torts).
Commentators have also suggested either incremental or radical movement towards
administrative programs to supplant class actions as a method of compensating victims of mass
torts. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV.
899, passim (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 469,564-65 (1994).
19 See, e.g., Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 791, 802-03 (1997) (defending class action settlement in large-scale asbestos
cases); Francis E. McGovem, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 595, 609-10, 613-14 (1997) (challenging some criticisms of class action
settlement practice); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class
Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615 (1997) (responding to criticism of proposed
amendment to civil rules that would explicitly permit use of settlement classes and codify other
current class action practices) [hereinafter Mullenix, Constitutionality]; David Rosenberg,
Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 210, 252-57 (1996) (expounding virtues of collective settlements in mass tort cases);
Vairo, supra note 17, at 165-66 (advocating specific judicial procedures to determine that
settlement funds are sufficient and distributed fairly); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: Postaggregatve Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 475, 550-56 (1991) (describing settlement process in asbestos class actions).
20 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal
1998] 1159
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with respect to class action settlement none has developed the case for requiring
individual consent to settlement in all class actions.21 Professor Rutherglen has
come closest to doing so by proposing delay in class certification until the
settlement phase of a class action, at which point notice would be issued to class
members, and opt-out rights afforded in all actions not seeking a classwide
injunction.2 2 He views the matter as one of timing-the right to opt out should
come at a meaningful time, hence certification should wait until enough
information emerges that the litigant can make a sensible decision about what
terms to accept.23 By contrast, the overriding concern of this Article is not timing,
but choice. Class action settlement should be allowed to take place at any stage of
the proceedings, just as an individual suit may be settled before, during, or after
trial. It should be the class member's decision whether to withhold acceptance of
the agreement pending the development of more information, or to take the
money now. Certification without settlement should also be allowed to take place
early. If the class representative chooses to press for quick certification in order to
Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461,462-74 (1997) (criticizing settlement class actions); Roger C.
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions ". An Introduction,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 811,825 (1995) ("Recent experience with class action settlements in mass
tort cases provides notice of danger signals that trial and appellate courts should be alert to in
reviewing the adequacy and reasonableness."); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1086-1126 (1995)
(criticizing process and substance of Amchem settlement); John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the
Cloverleaf, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 453,457-60 (1997) (criticizing mass tort settlement class actions);
John Leubsdorf, Co-opting the Class Action, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1225-26 (1995)
(suggesting that parties opposing the class can manipulate class counsel).
21 Some commentators have edged towards such a view. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REy. 805, 811 n.17 (1997) (observing that "settlement
decisions ultimately reflect an assessment of risk and are subject to individual variations in risk-
seeking or risk-aversion--decisions which should presumptively be left to the affected
individuals," but focusing on other questions and not having occasion to work out the
implications of this insight for the existing law of class action settlement); Patrick Wooley,
Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 610 (1997)
(arguing that a class member should have the right to reject a settlement, but only as part of a
broader argument that class members should be afforded the right to intervene in class action
proceedings if they believe the representative is inadequately representing their interest); see
also Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 858, 888-96 (1995) (discussing the importance of consent, which in tum depends on
notice and choice, in permitting tort litigation to accomplish the parties' goals). Professor
Marcus further contends that plaintiffs' consent has been dubious in many instances. See id. at
881-82. Nevertheless, he does not appear to advocate the choice of whether to accept
settlement in all instances, but simply advocates adequate notice and the right to opt out of the
class at the time of certification, among other incremental reforms. See id.
22 See George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258,270,278,288 (1996).
23 See id at 280-81.
1160 [Vol. 59:1155
CLASSACTIONSET"LEMENT
gain a strategic advantage over the defendant,2 4 or to obtain a prompt
determination whether shifting of litigation costs to the class will be possible,2 5
the class representative should be allowed to do so. But if the case then settles,
individual notice of the settlement should be provided to all class members, and
the members should have the right to accept the deal or opt out and possibly file
their own actions.
Part II of this Article discusses the law of class action settlement as it existed
before the Amchem decision. Part 11I describes Amchem's approach to class action
settlement and details its effects on class action settlement practice. Part IV
criticizes the approach taken by the case, citing examples of how it will frustrate
useful settlement agreements. Part V sketches an alternative view of the law of
class settlements, one that relies on individual consent. It takes up the advantages
of requiring consent, the components of meaningful consent in contrast to implied
consent, and the practical effects of a consent standard. Part VI discusses the
flaws of alternative approaches to regulating class action settlement. The last
section of the Article, Part VII, considers the limits of the consent-based model
and the problem of limited fund class actions.
II. THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION SEITLEMENTBEFOREAMCHEM
The class action device permits numbers of individuals to approach a court as
a single, temporary unit created for the litigation itself.26 A part of traditional
equity practice, by the late 1930s the class action had proven useful both for
resolving disputes among the members of organizations and for sharing the costs
of litigating similar small, individual claims against a single wrongdoer.27 In the
24 Many courts have commented on the potential strategic advantages of class proceedings
in some kinds of cases, occasionally characterizing the advantages as unfair. See, e.g., In re
Rhone-Pouleie Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295-1302 (7th Cir. 1995); Francis E. McGovern,
An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1830 (1995) ("If plaintiffs'
counsel can obtain class action certification and thereby increase the amount in dispute, the
defendant will be sufficiently averse to threats to its balance sheet and stock price that it will
favor settlement.").
25 As the Court stressed in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326
(1980), the availability of cost-shifting is a reason to bring or join in a class action. "A
significant benefit to claimants who choose to litigate their individual claims in a class-action
context is the prospect of reducing their costs of litigation, particularly attorney's fees, by
allocating such costs among all the members of the class who benefit from any recovery." Id. at
338 n.9.
2 6 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELI, FROM MEDIEVAL GRoup LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLAss ACTION 267-91 (1987) (analyzing the history of group litigation and the class action
device and tracing the roots of class action litigation to the high middle ages).
27 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Action Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 684-88 (1941) (discussing litigation as a device to assist in
curbing securities fraud and other misconduct in which individual damage was likely to be
modest). For more recent works discussing the history of class action litigation, see YEAZELI,
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1950s and 1960s, civil rights advocates used the class action to redress
discrimination28 and to obtain government benefits that were wrongfully
withheld.29 More recently, class actions have been brought in mass tort cases,
embracing the large number of claims that might be brought by the victims of a
single disaster, or the many, dispersed claims that could be brought against the
manufacturer of a defective medicine or other broadly marketed product.30 These
contemporary functions of class action suits affect the legal considerations
relevant to settlement of class actions. The considerations emerge from both the
current law of class actions and the specific requirements of class action
settlement.
A- The Law of Class Actions
The law of class actions includes both the explicit terms of the federal civil
rule that governs the topic, and an underlying legal controversy over the nature of
class action proceedings.
1. Federal Rule Requirements
Under the present federal rule governing class actions, all such proceedings
must meet basic standards of numerosity (a sufficiently large number of persons
in the class to justify combined treatment); common question (that the class
members share a common question of law or fact in the case); typicality (that the
claim of the class representative is typical of the claims of the members); and
representative adequacy (that the class representative will fairly and adequately
represent the class).31
supra note 26; John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23-The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705
(1997) (analyzing experience under 1938 version of Federal Rule 23 and its influence on the
1966 amendments); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Distant Mirror: The Bill of Peace in Early
American Mass Torts and Its Implications for Modem Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 711
(1997) (comparing defendants' use of class action to historical use of the equitable bill of peace
as means of protection against multiplicity of litigation); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and
Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 347, 395-
400 (1988) (discussing the pre-1966 "spurious" class action).
28 See, e.g., Note, Class Actions: A Study of Group Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. L.
REP. 991 (1956); Comment, The Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. C11. L.
REV. 577 (1953). For more recent commentary on the topic, see Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights
Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 (1997);
Weber, supra note 27, at 350-53.
2 9 See FRANCIS Fox PivEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCrIoNs OF PUBLIC WELFARE 307 (1971).
30 For an early discussion of this trend, see Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions:
Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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In addition, a class action must meet one of three other requirements, which
will determine how it is classified for the application of still other requirements
and procedures.32 Cases under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23 are often
termed "mandatory class actions" because they afford class members no right to
opt out. Subdivision (b)(1) is for cases in which separate actions would create a
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would result in inconsistent
standards for the entity opposing the class, and for those cases in which individual
dispositions would effectively dispose of interests of other members not parties to
the case or otherwise unable to protect their own interests. Subdivision (b)(2)
covers cases in which the entity opposing the class has acted or failed to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, maling injunctive or declaratory relief
appropriate for the class as a whole. Subdivision (b)(3) cases are those in which
the questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over those affecting
individual members, and the class action is superior to other methods of handling
the case.33
2. Representation or Joinder?
In legal history as well as under the present rules, two contrasting views of
class action litigation appear: first, that the action is a single case brought by a
group that is represented by the named party and can be treated as a unit because
of its innate coherence; and second, that the action is an amalgamation of many
joined actions of individuals. 34 Representative litigation on behalf of (or against)
unified communal groups has been a fixture of the Anglo-American legal
landscape since the high Medieval era.35 Early English cases and many later
American ones embody ideas of the coherence of the group approaching the court
and the representative nature of the action.36 Nevertheless, over the years,
concerns about individual justice have led to an increasing emphasis on individual
3 2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
33 For subdivision (b)(3) cases, the findings relevant to predominance and superiority
include the interest of the members of the class in individual control of their own actions or
defenses; the extent and nature of litigation already on file; the desirability of concentrating the
litigation in one forum; and potential difficulties for managing the class action. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) (clarifying roles of subdivision (b) classifications).
34 See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?,
1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 459 (describing conflicting perspectives). For a more recent endorsement
of the representation view and nearly all that it entails, see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (1998) (favoring the "class
entity" approach). As detailed throughout this Article, I believe that such class action atavism is
not justified; instead, individual claimants' interests deserve protection and can be afforded
protection without undue social costs.
35 See YEAZEL, supra note 26, at 38-39.
36 See id. at 220-21. As Yeazell indicates, this description may be exaggerated with
respect to late nineteenth and early twentieth century American cases. See id. at 222-24.
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rights, particularly individual rights vis-a-vis government decision makers. 37 At
the same time these concerns were surfacing, lawyers began to use class actions
for less cohesive groups. The upshot has been the dominance, at present, of a
joinder view of class actions, rather than a unified entity view. Each member of
the cobbled-together group is entitled to procedural justice.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has contributed to this emphasis on
individual rights and joinder by paying special attention to the role of individual
class members and their entitlements to due process in class action litigation. In
1985, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts38 established that absent plaintiff class
members have due process rights with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the
court hearing their case.39 Phillips held that although the class member need not
have minimum contacts with the forum, the forum court has to afford the member
notice and the right to opt out of any (b)(3)-type case predominantly for money
relief.40 The Court went so far as to consistently refer to the class members as
"plaintiffs," as if to emphasize their individual suits41 This emphasis on the
individual case within the class action dovetailed with the Court's 1973 ruling42
that each class member's damages must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in a
class action under federal diversity jurisdiction, and that the amounts may not be
added together43 to meet the limit.44
37 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in
Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 689 (1997) ("It would have made as little sense to
medieval lawyers to ask about the litigative standing of communities as it would to ask a
modem lawyer why individuals can litigate?).
38 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
39 See id at 806.
40 See id. at 811-12.
41 See id passim.
42 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291,301 (1973).
43 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (refusing to accumulate claims when no
named plaintiffs met jurisdictional amount).
44 See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 308-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the tension between the
refusal to extend jurisdiction over the class members who fail to meet the jurisdictional amount
and the traditional extension of jurisdiction over class members who are not diverse); see also
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1921) (extending diversity
jurisdiction over non-diverse class members), noted in Zahn, 414 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). One possible way to reconcile Zahn and Ben-Hur is to allow diversity class actions
in (b)(1) class actions, the "true" class actions that Ben-Hur foreshadowed, but to reject
diversity classes in (b)(3) situations such as mass torts. Zahn relied on the character of (b)(3)
actions as .'congeries of separate suits."' Id. at 296 (quoting Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164
F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947)). Because (b)(3) mass tort cases are based on state law and state
courts have significant institutional advantages in developing and applying that law, there may
be little basis to quarrel with a result that keeps them out of federal court. Nevertheless, when
the Supreme Court finally resolves the issue, it may find some means to distinguish
jurisdictional amount from citizenship, or it might also view the 1990 Supplemental Jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994), as a congressional authorization of diversity class actions,
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Irrespective of whether the emphasis is placed on the combined unit or the
individual in a class action, there should be no turning back the clock on
protecting individual class members' procedural rights. A cause of action that
could be filed individually in court is a valuable property interest. 45 It should be
able to be extinguished by resjudicata only when the court provides its owner
with adequate notice and the right to be heard.46
B. Class Action Settlements
The current law of class action settlement coexists uneasily with the
dominance of the joinder view of class actions and the recognition of due process
rights of individual class members. As a descriptive matter, the law of settlement
approval and review has both procedural and substantive components, and each
perhaps even when the class members have claims below the jurisdictional minimum (thus
overruling Zahn). See Weber, State Courts, supra note 16, at 224-57. Section 1367 provides
generally for supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of additional parties when the
state claims are so related to claims in the action within the court's original jurisdiction that they
are part of the same Article Ill case and controversy, although the court may decline jurisdiction
on a number of discretionary grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c). Although section 1367
excludes some means by which additional parties are brought into cases whose jurisdiction is
based on diversity, class actions are not on the forbidden list. See In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d
524, 530 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599,
607 (7th Cir. 1997) (adopting same view). But see McGowan v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 941
F. Supp. 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (disagreeing with Abbott's interpretation of § 1367).
Nevertheless, the potential ability to extend supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of
plaintiff class members does not undermine the predominance of the view that the class
members all possess their own individual cases and merit protection of their rights. Significant
commentary exists on section 1367 and the amount in controversy in diversity actions. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991) (responding to Rowe, infra);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental
Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) (responding to criticisms
of the 1990 Supplemental Jurisdiction statute); Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party
Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85 (1992) (commenting on Rowe, supra and Arthur, supra); Joel
E. Tasca, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Effect of the Supplemental Jurisdiction
Statute on the Complete Amount in Controversy Rule: A Case for Plain Meaning Statutory
Construction, 46 EMORY LJ. 435 (1997) (analyzing effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 on Zahn).
4 5 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (holding
that due process protects interest of beneficiaries of common trust fund accounts in periodic
action to settle claims); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,42-43 (applying due process protection
to interest of absent class members); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
433-37 (1982) (finding due process protection for employment discrimination claim filed with
state administrative agency); Weber, supra note 27, at 374-79 (making this argument at much
greater length). In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that I was one of the
attomeys for the plaintiff in Logan.
46 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807 (citing Mullane). This argument is made at much greater
length in a previous work of mine. See Weber, supra note 27, at 380-94.
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of these has various subcomponents. 47
The procedural aspect of class action settlement comprises two steps. First,
counsel make a proposed deal and submit it to the court for a preliminary fairness
evaluation. The court may draw on the record of the discovery already completed,
and it may rely on presentations from the attorneys or parties involved in the
litigation up to the point of settlement.48 Some courts hear testimony from court-
appointed experts or from special masters at this stage of proceedings.4 9
The second procedural step occurs after tentative court approval of the
proposal. The court directs that class members be provided notice of the
settlement terms and the date and time of a formal fairness hearing.50 Under Rule
23(e), class members are entitled to notice of a proposed dismissal or compromise
of a class action. Unlike the notice of class action status and the right to opt out
that Rule 23(c)(2) requires for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, however, the notice
need not be an individual mailing directed to each class member. Less effective
methods, such as publication, will suffice.51
Ordinarily, the notice will solicit written statements of objection from class
members, and the hearing will give class members and potential intervenors the
opportunity to present their objections in person as well. 52 The court may approve
47 The tension between evaluation of process of mass tort settlement and evaluation of
result is discussed in Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When
the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1207-11 (1995).
4 8 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LnmGATION § 30.41 (3d ed. 1995).
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding publication
notice and stating "[w]hile Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual notice when the names of the
individuals can be easily ascertained, ... there is no such rigid requirement under Rule 23(e).")
(citation omitted); Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 921 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (table; text
found at No. 89-3137, 1990 WL 223029, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 1990)) (approving notice
program that relied primarily on publication); Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1222-23
(6th Cir. 1981) (stating that district court has "virtually complete discretion" about the kind of
notice of settlement afforded the class), supplemented on reh'g, 670 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1982); cf
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807, 813 (5th Cir. 1989) (refusing to invalidate
consent decree because of limited response from claimants to program of notification of
availability of relief primarily consisting of publication).
52 Interestingly, Rule 23 itself does not require a hearing, though some authorities contend
that the practice "should be considered obligatory." See Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S.
Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Problems of Judges in Dealing with Class Action
Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369, 375 (1995); see also David Cramp, What Really Happens During
Class Certification? A Primerfor the First-Time Defense Attorney, 10 REV. LmG. 1, 21 (1990)
(noting that courts will typically hold the hearing). Because the procedure does not guarantee
any particular claimant the right to be heard on that individual's cause of action, the hearing in
itself would not appear to satisfy any due process requirements that might apply to the situation.
Nevertheless, the court would cut itself off from important sources of information about the
justice of the settlement were it not to hold a hearing, and class members might be more prone
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the settlement despite the objections, however.53 Even objections from named
plaintiffs are not fatal to the settlement proposal. 54
The Shutts right to opt out of class litigation (at least for out-of-state class
members in state court class actions for monetary relief) is not the right to opt out
of a proposed settlement. Notice of settlement may accompany notice of class
action status under Rules 23(b)(3) and (c), of course, and if the class action has
been filed only for settlement purposes, the two will be combined with the notice
of the right to opt out. This expedient effectively establishes a right to opt out of
the settlement in Rule 23(b)(3) settlement-only class cases. But the individual,
mailed notice of a post-certification settlement and a right to refuse to accept it are
not required by the rules or by Shutts. Indeed, in mandatory class actions, those
involving limited funds and those primarily for equitable relief, there is no right to
opt out of either the class or the settlement, just as there are no rights to any form
of individual notice. Even in (b)(3)-type class actions, the opt-out right that is
guaranteed by Rule 23 is the one to be exercised at the time of certification, not at
time of settlement.
With regard to substantive review of the agreement, the two steps in the
process call for somewhat different questions to be asked about the settlement's
origins and merits. In tentatively approving the pact and deciding to hold a
hearing, the district court is to look to (1) the factual development of the case, (2)
general impressions of reasonableness of the proposal, (3) the circumstances
under which the lawyers negotiated the proposed settlement, (4) extant objections
to the settlement, and (5) considerations about any attorneys' fees component of
the agreement.55
In making the ultimate decision on the merits of the settlement after receiving
the information presented at the fairness hearing, district courts need to compare
the settlement terms with the likely result if the case were to be litigated to
judgment:
First, the district court must evaluate the likelihood that plaintiffs would prevail
at trial. Second, the district court must establish a range of possible recovery that
plaintiffs would realize if they prevailed at trial. And third, guided by its findings
to mount collateral challenges to the settlement if they were not afforded an opportunity to be
heard in person. Additional information does have its costs, however. See Edward J. Brunet, A
Study in the Allocation of Scarce Resources: The Efficiency ofFederal Intervention Criteria, 12
GA. L. REV. 701, 740-42 (1978) (discussing informational value of permitting intervention in
complex cases).
53 See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving
class settlement over objections from more than one-third of the class).
54 See, eg., Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981)
(upholding settlement over objections by several named plaintiffs).
55 See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION: CAsEs AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 515-16 (2d ed. 1992). Similar considerations are
listed and discussed in MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.41-30.42 (3d ed. 1995).
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on plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing on the merits and such other factors as may
be relevant the district court must establish, in effect the point on, or if
appropriate, below, the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair
and adequate.56
Courts of appeal will not overturn district court decisions on the adequacy of
settlements unless they find an abuse of discretion, though some courts make a
more thorough review of the district court's determination than others do.
5 7
Although standards for class action settlement are better developed in the federal
courts than in those of the states, the factors the state courts consider are similar as
is the standard of review. 58
56 In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir. 1981). Some
courts apply similar considerations without explicitly listing them. See, e.g., In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 170-74 (2d Cir. 1987). Other courts' formulas are
more baroque, but the basics of the test are the same. The Third Circuit, for example, uses nine
factors:
MIhis court has adopted a nine-factor test to help district courts structure their final
decisions to approve settlements .... Those factors are: (1) the complexity and duration of
the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings;
(4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of
maintaining a class action; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater
judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best recovery;
and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of
litigation.
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citing Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)); see also Bennett v.
Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (using six-factor analysis).
57 Some reviewing courts state the standard in less deferential terms than do others.
Compare, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426,434 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[For the settlement] to
survive appellate review, the district court must show it has explored comprehensively all
relevant factors.") (citation omitted), with, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,
455 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[S]o much respect is accorded the opinion of the trial court in these matters
that this Court will intervene in a judicially approved settlement of a class action only when the
objectors.., have made a clear showing that the District Court has abused its discretion.')
(citations omitted). A number of courts make a more stringent review of settlements negotiated
before class certification. See, e.g., In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 787 (3d Cir. 1994); County
of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1323 (2d Cir. 1990); In re General
Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1126 (7th Cir. 1979).
58 See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265, 1288 (Ala. 1995) (applying seven-
factor test drawn from decisions of the federal courts of appeals); Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A2d
89, 93 (Del. Ch. 1968) (weighing settlement terms against probability of recovery at trial);
People ex rel. Wilcox v. Equity Funding Life Ins. Co., 335 N.E.2d 448, 455-56 (Il. 1975)
(deferring to the trial court's discretion and calling for a balance of the probability of success
against the expense and duration of litigation); Buchanan v. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
393 A.2d 704,710 (Pa. 1978) (stating that "[t]he court should... attempt to make a reasonable
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The basic evaluation that the court must make in approving a settlement of a
class action is certainly the correct one from the perspective of the class members.
Is the class better off settling now or taking its chances on continuing to litigate?
The information that the present law of class settlement requires the court to
consider is unquestionably relevant to this determination, and if the court follows
the approach articulated by the courts of appeals, it will structure its
decisionmaking wisely.
What the court will not do, however, is make a conclusion about whether any
individual member of the class might come to a different decision. Indeed, the
rule that objections, even those of class representatives, may be ignored,
emphasizes the collective nature of the preference that the district court must
construct. By no means does the law instruct the court to exempt objectors from
the settlement, nor is the court to allow opt outs in any case in which certification
has already been accomplished. The court makes a single, group choice,
displacing the individual choice of the particular class members. In this crucial
respect, the court goes even beyond the old idea of representation in departing
from the joinder model of a class action. All the claims of the individuals meld
into a single claim of the mass, and the fairness of the settlement for that
imaginary claim is the question the court must answer.
IUI. AMCHEM'S APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS
Although Amchem will limit the types of class actions that the federal courts
will entertain, it will have only a modest impact on class settlement. The scope of
the impact is determined by the somewhat unusual terms of the Amchem
settlement itself, and by the specific matters the Court decided or left for future
decision.
A. The Amchem Settlement
The Amchem case itself arose from the consolidation of pending federal
asbestos products liability litigation in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. When attempts to reach a global settlement of pending cases failed,
attorneys for the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and a consortium of defendants
agreed to settle the existing inventory of cases being handled by attorneys who
were members of the Committee,59 while at the same time launching and settling
a class action case embracing the claims of persons who had been exposed to
asbestos manufactured by the defendants but who had not yet filed lawsuits.
The complaint and answer were filed on the same day, as were a proposed
estimate of the probability of success.").
59 One such agreement called for the payment of more than $200 million to release the
claims of one set of inventory plaintiffs. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,
2239 (1997).
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settlement agreement and a joint motion for conditional certification of the
class. 60 The class, which contained no distinct subclasses, embraced all persons
who had not filed an asbestos-related lawsuit against one of the defendants as of
January 15, 1993 (the filing date) who had been exposed, either occupationally or
through the occupational exposure of a spouse or household member, to asbestos
from one of the defendants, and all persons whose spouses or family members
had been exposed in the same way but who had not yet filed suit.61 The
settlement of these individuals' claims called for compensation of persons with
four types of disease: mesothelioma, lung cancer, some other cancers (colon,
rectal, laryngeal, esophageal, and stomach cancer), and asbestosis and bilateral
pleural thickening.62 Some other medical claims could potentially be covered, but
the settlement limited the number of "exceptional" claims falling outside the
specified diagnostic categories that would receive compensation. 63 Ranges of
damages were set for each disease category. For example, mesothelioma victims
qualified for the highest compensation, a range of $20,000 to $200,000, with
defendants proposing a level of compensation within the stated range, and a
dispute resolution procedure for quarrels over diagnoses and compensation
amounts.64 Exlraordinary claims could obtain compensation above the set range,
but limits existed on the number of claims and the amount to be paid for them.65
"Case flow maximums" also limited the number of claims paid per disease
category per year.66
No compensation was to be allowed for loss of consortium by family
members of exposed individuals, for pleural plaques without physical
impairment, nor for risk of future illness, fear of future illness, or medical
monitoring for those without manifest current injury.67 Persons without current
injury were made able to qualify for compensation at some future time if they
then met the criteria for compensable disease.68 Statutes of limitations were
waived, but the schedule of benefits was not to be adjusted for future inflation. 69
The settlement agreement further provided that class members were
permitted to leave the settlement process and elect binding arbitration or a tort
action. However, the numbers that could leave were limited to one percent of the
total number of claims that qualified for payment in a given injury category in the
60 See id.
61 See id. at 2239-40 n.5.
62 See id. at 2240.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id at 2240 n.6.
66 See id at 2240.
67 See id
68 See id
69 See id at 2240-41.
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previous year, and even then punitive damages claims and claims for increased
risk of cancer were waived.70 The attorneys for the class were to receive fees
from the settlement award, in an amount set by the district court.71
Information about the settlement accompanied the notice of the pendency of
the action issued in accordance with the requirements of Rule 23(c). 72 Because
the notice gave the class members the opportunity to opt out of the class, it
effectively gave those it reached the chance to opt out of the settlement as well.
The notice plan had three basic components: individual first-class mail notices to
about nine thousand persons who filed suit between January 15, 1993, and the
time notice was issued, efforts to identify other class members and send them
individual notice; and to all others, notice through publication and through third
parties.73 The second and third components called for the most effort. Fifty-six
unions were contacted and solicited for names and addresses of members and
retired members who had worked around asbestos. Information packets were sent
to over one thousand attorneys known to have previously handled asbestos cases
against any of the relevant defendants.74 The parties placed ads in 292
newspapers and in Parade magazine, developed a thirty-second television
announcement, and issued press releases and public service messages.75 Finally,
information went to state and federal courts as well as to forty trade or other
affiliative organizations known to contain workers likely to have been exposed to
asbestos.76 Massive numbers of information packets were sent out in response to
70 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated,
83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231
(1997). The effect of the loss of the increased risk claim was ameliorated by the settlement's
reservation of the right to make an additional claim should cancer develop later. See id. at 282.
Five years was also allowed for payment of damages that exceeded 150% of the defendants'
last settlement offer. See id.
71 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2241.
72 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The rule provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class
if the member so requests by a specified date; (3) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
Id.
73 See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
74 See id at 321.
75 See id at 321-22.
76 See id. at 323.
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inquiries spurred by media and third-party dissemination of information 7 7 Of
those who received notice, about 87,000 individuals successfully excluded
themselves from the Amchem class, though they were required to execute two
opt-out forms (one during each of two different time periods) to do so.78
The district court conditionally certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3),
approved the notice plan, heard objections to the settlement, finalized the class
certification, and approved the settlement as fair and adequate.7 9 The court went
on to enjoin class members from beginning any asbestos-related suit against any
of the defendants in any state or federal court.80 The class members who had
objected to the settlement appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed, vacating
the certification on the grounds that it did not comport with Rule 23.81
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit reversing the
settlement, though it rejected the court of appeals' reasoning that a settlement
class action had to conform to exactly the same application of the Rule 23
standards as the case would if it were to be tried.82 Justice Ginsburg wrote for a
six-member majority.83 With regard to settlement class actions, the Supreme
Court commented:
77 The district court declared:
This Court incorporates here as credible and reliable the [Settling Parties'] Final Report
[on Implementation of the Notice] which stated that 35 national or international unions had
run the court-approved "clip art" in the publications delivered individually to the homes of
over 6 million union members and retirees, and that nine national or international unions
had had notice materials mailed individually to almost 400,000 union members or retirees.
The Final Report, adopted and credited here, also explained the multi-million dollar media
campaign undertaken to publicize the class action and proposed settlement, and reported
that over 320,000 individual notice packets and over 4,000 copies of the Stipulation had
been mailed to potential class members in response to calls to the special 800-number
listed in all notice materials. All in all, the Final Notice Report, adopted and credited here,
stated, over 6.8 million individuals received individually delivered notice materials, and
millions more were notified through media efforts.
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,312 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
78 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-0215, 1995 WL 561297, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1995).
79 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 337.
80 See Archem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2234 (1997).
81 See Georgine v. Arnchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,634 (3d Cir. 1996).
82 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
83 Justice O'Connor did not participate, and Justices Breyer and Stevens concurred in part
and dissented in part. See id. at 2231.
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We agree with [the settlement proponents] to this limited extent: settlement is
relevant to a class certification. The Third Circuit's opinion bears modification in
that respect .... Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification,
a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems,... for the proposal is that there be no trial.84
This view signals an acceptance of the practice of bringing a class action case
for the sole purpose of putting a settlement into place,85 though the Court
explicitly reserved the question whether the practice is permissible under the
constitutional restriction of Article III courts to "cases and controversies. 86
Settlement classes have been criticized on the ground that a case that will never be
tried, and that would be unmanageable if tried, has no discernable settlement
value, and thus the class members will likely be under-compensated by any
settlement.87 This criticism falls wide, however, for the settlement class action is
composed of claims that could be tried individually and thus have a settlement
value which can be aggregated to make an estimate of the value of the combined
case.
The Court did not credit any objection of this type in discussing settlement-
only class actions, though it gave one cautionary comment in arguing that the
overall settlement faimess inquiry under Rule 23(e) should not be permitted to
supplant the inquiry whether the provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) are met.88
The Court commented that in settlement-only class cases, if litigation to judgment
were not a realistic option and the court did not consider the (a) and (b) factors,
class counsel would be "disarmed" in that they could not use the threat of
litigation to obtain a better offer from the defendants, and the district court would
be hampered in evaluating the settlement for lack of information obtained in
adversarial investigation.89 Nevertheless, the Court did not consider the
settlement-only aspect of such a case-apart from its failure to meet the
subdivision (a) and (b) standards-to be significant enough to condemn all
settlement class cases. The threat of individual litigation can provide leverage in
large-clain mass tort cases even when group litigation is unlikely.90
84 Id. at 2248.
85 The Court also made other remarks that might indicate an acceptance of settlement-only
classes, stating that the 'settlement-only' class has become a stock device," and that "all
Federal Circuits recognize the utility of Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes." Id. at 2247.
86 Id. at 2244.
87 See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 811.
88 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
89 See id at 2248-49.
90 Moreover, as Professor Resnik notes, few cases, aggregated or not, make it to trial,
whereas many of both kinds of cases are litigated through significant pretrial proceedings. See
Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 835, 838-40 (1997). The non-triable class action case might have a
settlement value because the threat of aggregate pretrial litigation causes the defendant to fear
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While rejecting the Third Circuit's demand that the case be able to be tried as
a class action, the Court accepted the court of appeals' careful review of the
settlement to determine whether the class members' interests were adequately
represented.91 The Court stated that settlement heightens, rather than diminishes,
the attention courts must pay to the requirements of the class action rule
concerning the predominance of common questions and the adequacy of
representation.92 It noted that the rule imposes the subdivision (a) and (b)
requirements on all class actions, settled or not, and it questioned the ability of
class counsel to negotiate a fair agreement in cases in which the standards were
not met.93 Although it stressed the desirability of a comprehensive solution to the
asbestos litigation crisis, 9 4 it found that the class action solution adopted in the
case failed because the requirements of common question predominance and
representative adequacy were not met under the case's facts.95
On the topic of the predominance of common legal or factual questions, a
basic requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the Court ruled that the benefits of a
settlement in providing sure and swift compensation are not relevant to the
question of predominance.96 Instead, the question depends on underlying legal or
factual questions related to each class member's individual case, "questions that
preexist any settlement."97 The Court noted that though the fact of exposure to
asbestos might be sufficient to meet the requirement of Rule 23(a) that there be
some common question of law or fact, it was insufficient to meet the "far more
demanding" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that the question predominate.98 It
cited the Third Circuit's opinion in listing non-common questions for the class
members, including differences of time, method, and duration of exposure,
different histories of tobacco smoking, and vast differences among exposure-only
claimants and between them and persons already manifesting illness.99 The Court
echoed the Third Circuit's concern that differences in state law compounded the
problems arising from factual disparities among the class members.100
The Court amplified the discussion of the difference among class members
disaggregated trial results and imposes significant litigation costs on the defendant. See id.
91 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
92 See id.
93 See id at 2248-49.
94 The Court opened and closed its opinion on this theme. See id. at 2237-38, 2252.
95 The Court did not reject any of the underlying factual findings of the district court in
favor of the settlement, but stated that it was focusing on the Rule's requirements and
explaining why the requirements could not be met for a class "so enormously diverse and
problematic as the one the District Court certified." Id. at 2249-50 & n.17.
9 6 See id. at 2249.
97 Id.





by contrasting the case with class actions alleging consumer fraud, securities
fraud, and antitrust violations. 10 1 Though the Court averred that mass tort cases
may satisfy the predominance test, it emphasized that caution is needed when
individual stakes are high and disparities among class members are great.'0 2 It
repeated a statement from the Advisory Committee Note to the current rule
emphasizing the likely differences among class members in mass accident
cases.
103
The minimum that the Court's language about predominance would appear
to require is that ill claimants and exposed-but-not-yet-ill claimants need to be in
two separate subclasses in toxic exposure cases such as Amchem. A broad reading
would bar the use of a class action altogether for persons who have not yet
manifested injury and would insist on some similarity in the nature of exposure
and disease for those allowed to sue. Separate classes based on which state law
applies (or perhaps based on which categories of law the applicable state falls
into) would be required as well.
The Court also found that the case failed the test of representative adequacy:
that the named parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.104 The Court stated that the purpose of the test is to identify conflicts of
interest between the named parties and the class members; the standard sounds
both in economy and in fairness to the class members.105 It also includes
considerations about class counsel's competence and freedom from conflicts,
considerations the Court declined to address directly.106
The Court's criticism of representative adequacy under the facts of the case
centered on the diversity of interests in the "single giant class" represented by the
named plaintiffs. 107 The Court stressed that those who currently are injured have
large, immediate payments as their overriding goal, while exposure-only
claimants have a conflicting interest in an ample fund to compensate future
injuries, one that will be protected from potential inflation. 10 8 The settlement
reflected allocation decisions and limited the defendants' total liability. Future
claimants lost any adjustment for inflation and any compensation for loss of
consortium; they also lost any slight chance to quit the settlement and pursue
other relief. The Court admitted that an absence of separate representatives in the
settlement process frees the representatives to pursue the aggregate interests of the
group as a whole, but the Court emphasized the representatives' responsibilities to
101 See id
102 See id
103 See id (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966)).
104 See id
105 See id. at 2250-51 & n.20.
106 See id at 2251 n.20.
10 7 See id at 2251.
108 See id
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pursue the objectives of a group with similar interests and to approve the
settlement based only on the benefit to that distinct group.109
The Court compared Amchem, with its combined class, to an employment
discrimination case in which persons who were denied employment are in the
same class with current employees. 110 If the rejected applicants obtain jobs from
the litigation, they will then compete with the existing employees for seniority
and fringe benefits. In General Telephone Co. v. FalconI I the Court held that a
single named plaintiff could not represent both groups. The Court's comparison
of the two situations is telling. Neither Falcon nor any other case has forbidden
rejected applicants and current employees from joining in the same litigation as
long as the plaintiffs are properly subclassed according to interest. The Court thus
held open the possibility that settlements in cases like Amchem might be proper if
they are reached by representatives of distinct subclasses advocating for each
groups' interests.1 12
The opening may have been closed, however, by the Court's comments
regarding notice. Without ruling decisively on the matter, the Court expressed
grave reservations about the possibility of providing notice to a class containing
persons who have not yet manifested disease. Not discussing the specific,
herculean efforts of the Amchem litigants to provide notice, the Court stressed that
persons unaware of their exposure or uninformed about the risks of future
impairment may be unable to fully appreciate the importance of a decision to
participate or to decline to do So.13 The holders of potential consortium claims,
i.e., future spouses and children of asbestos victims, are impossible to identify at
the present time, and so, the Court emphasized, they are also impossible to
notify. 114 The Court recognized "the gravity of the question whether class action
notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to
legions so unselfconscious and amorphous." 15
As with the holding on predominance of common questions, a minimal
reading of the Court's holding on representative adequacy would be that currently
1 0 9 See id.
110 See id.
111 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 &n.13 (1982).
112 This is not to say that a stricter application of Falcon would have no impact on the
present world of class action litigation. One commentator has decried the courts' inattention to
Falcon's requirements, contending that the class members' interests demand strict application
of adequacy of representation standards. See Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions:
Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 649-51
(1994); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of
Representation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 607, 657-60 (1993) [hereinafter Downs, Impact].





injured individuals and those who have been exposed to a toxic product but have
not manifested any injury would need to be in two different subclasses with
separately named plaintiffs and attorneys, who could then negotiate with the
defendants a settlement similar to the one that the District Court approved. This
reading is dubiously faithful to the Court's opinion, however. The Court's
discussion of the predominance of common questions identified conflicts among
the members of the potential subclasses, particularly the persons who would be
within the subclass of individuals who have been exposed but, have not
manifested injury. These conflicts would likely necessitate still further
subclassing, to the point where the litigation would become difficult to manage
and a settlement unlikely to emerge. 116 Moreover, the Court's comments on
notice, though not a clear holding, cast severe doubt on the use of a class to
dispose of the claims of persons who have not yet manifested injury, unless those
persons can somehow be identified individually and have the significance of their
claims explained to them.
The real effect of Amchem on the law of class action settlement is thus not a
set of particular rules that settlements of class cases must conform to, but rather a
limit on the kinds of cases that may be brought as class actions, and given the
potential to result in a comprehensive settlement at all. The limits remain hazy. 17
A class case may include persons with current injuries, and possibly those with
future injuries not yet manifest, but the categories of persons have to be separated,
perhaps into multiple subclasses of each group. Moreover, those in the exposed-
but-not-yet-ill group may not be able to be included at all unless notice
requirements are somehow met. Apart from the Court's skeptical comments
about allocation decisions that eliminated inflation protection and consortium
claims, there were no statements on what a comprehensive toxic tort settlement
would need to look like. The significance of even those comments was hedged by
their insertion into a broader discussion about the procedural importance of
subelassing.
116 See id. at 2255-56 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[S]ubclasses
can have problems of their own. 'There can be a cost in creating more distinct subgroups, each
with its own representation .... [Tjhe more subclasses created, the more severe conflicts
bubble to the surface and inhibit settlement...."' (quoting JACK WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 66 (1995))); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent
Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 360 (1998) (raising difficulties about
compensation of subclass attorneys); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 506-07 (discussing
additional difficulties of subclassing).
1 17 Commentators have already marked out positions about what effects the holding will
have on settlement of mass tort class actions. Compare Eric D. Green, A Post-Georgine Note,
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873, 873 (1997) ("Amehem ... appears to have sounded the death-knell
for mass tort class actions (whether settled or litigated) under the current version of Rule 23."),
with Linda S. Mullenix, Court Settles Settlement Class Issue, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B12




The concurring and dissenting opinion was equally cautious in articulating a
set of rules about settlement of cases like Amchem. Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Stevens, agreed with the majority that settlement ought to be relevant to
class certification but concluded that the case should have been remanded for
further factual development about the settlement. 118 The opinion's main thrust
was that the majority had given insufficient attention to the social need for a
resolution of the asbestos litigation crisis and that the court of appeals ought to
have been given the opportunity to review the district court's efforts to
demonstrate that the case met reasonable standards of predominance and
representative adequacy.1 19 Justice Breyer insisted that the need for the court
system to respond to the predicament of the parties is great and lends support for
the settlement;120 he argued that settlement ought to receive greater weight in
considering the case's satisfaction of the predominance standard; 121 he questioned
the wisdom of overturning the district court's findings on adequacy of
representation without the court of appeals having considered the issue;122 he
questioned whether the Court's opinion gave an unjustified impression that the
settlement was unfair; 123 and he rejected the Court's suggestion that notice was
inadequate, at least in the absence of a review of the parties' and the district
court's extensive efforts at notice.124 Justice Breyer concluded that the Court gave
too little deference to the district court's extensive review of factual materials
pertaining to the fairness of the settlement.125
Although Amchem concerned only the federal class action rule, its reasoning
is sure to be persuasive to courts construing state class action statutes and rules
with similar language. Moreover, because Shutts establishes that minimum
protections of class members' interests spring from constitutional due process,
courts applying state laws will need to be careful in approving settlement classes
with comparably weak degrees of common-question predominance or
representative adequacy.126
I18 See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252-53 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
119 See id. at 2253.
120 See id.
121 See idl at 2254.
122 See id. at 2256.
123 See id at 2257.
124 See id at 2257-58.
125 See id.
126 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (establishing due




C. The Amchem Non-Decision--Questions Not Decided
The Court failed to make any of the global pronouncements that might have
been expected of it regarding the general propriety of using class actions in mass
tort cases, the ability of Article I courts to exercise jurisdiction in class actions
brought only for purposes of settlement, and the propriety of settling inventory
claims at the same time as future injury claims, for different amounts. On the first
issue, the Court declared that the text of subdivision (b)(3) does not rule out
classes composed of persons with individual personal injury claims for substantial
damages. 127 Nonetheless, it urged caution, quoting the Third Circuit's statement
that each class member has "'a substantial stake in making individual decisions
on whether and when to settle.' ' 128 The Supreme Court explained that the
drafters had "dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of groups of people
who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into
court at all.' ' 129 The Court went on to quote a Seventh Circuit opinion stating that
the basic policy behind the class action is to aggregate claims that would not
create recoveries large enough to justify individual lawsuits. 130
The Court's comments and quotations questioning the use of class actions to
aggregate large-recovery injury claims should do little to discourage the trend
towards bringing mass tort cases as class actions, for each would-be class
representative will argue that the case is that rare action justifying application of
the rule. As the Court stated, nothing in the text of the rule excludes those cases
from certification. 131 The Court may also have lent some oblique encouragement
by declining to give a ringing endorsement to the commonly cited 1966 Advisory
Committee Note that states that a class action is generally not appropriate in a
mass accident case.132 However, by suggesting caution and a case-by-case
approach, the Court might be bolstering the position of those circuit courts that
have rejected class actions as "immature" torts on the ground that combined
treatment does not make sense until there is a record of how numerous juries have
treated the cases. 133 If the view of those circuit courts prevails, the valuation
127 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2246.
128 Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,633 (3d Cir. 1996)).
129 Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 497,
497 (1969)). Professor Kaplan chaired the 1966 Advisory Committee, which drafted the rule.
130 Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338,344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
131 SeeAmchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2246.
132 The Court quoted portions of the note stating that mass accident cases present
significant questions affecting different class members in different ways, and therefore class
treatment is usually not appropriate. However, the Court also observed that the text of Rule 23
does not categorically forbid class certification in mass tort cases, and it acknowledged the trend
towards certification of those cases. See id at 2250. The Court described the Advisory
Committee's language as a warning and advised caution. See id
133 These cases include Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996),
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problem in class action settlements will diminish, but the decreased availability of
class actions will produce increased judicial effort on dispersed, overlapping cases
and greater delay in obtaining recoveries for plaintiffs and resjudicata protection
for defendants in mass tort injuries.134
On the second issue, that of Article 1]1,135 the Amchem Court simply asserted
that the resolution of the appropriateness of the class certification was "logically
antecedent to the existence of any Article III issues" and so had to be reached
first.136 In a sense, the Court was correct, for the jurisdictional problem does not
arise if, as was the case in Amchem, the matter cannot be brought as a class action.
Nevertheless, the contrary approach is equally plausible, for there would be no
need to reach the appropriateness of certification if jurisdiction did not exist. The
practical effect of the Court's reservation of the issue is to cast some, though
probably not overwhelming, doubt on the propriety of a class composed of
persons exposed to a substance who have not yet filed suit and may not have
manifested injuries.1 37
The reason that the doubt does not overwhelm is the strength of the argument
in favor of jurisdiction for such an action. It is as logical to consider the injury to
and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). The Castano case is
criticized in Note, Class Actions-Class Certification of Mass Torts-Fifth Circuit Decertifies
Nationwide Tobacco Class-Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996),
110 HARv. L. REv. 977, 979-80 (1997), on the grounds that it grafts a merits-based maturity
test onto Rule 23. However, in light of Amchem, one might respond that the superiority of class
action treatment (one of Rule 23's requirements for (b)(3) cases) depends on the existence of
other, prior litigation from which the court may draw valuation data in considering settlement.
Cf Heather M. Johnson, Note, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation Within the
Federal Rules: A Case for the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2329, 2235-46 (1996) (criticizing Rhone-Poulenc for reversing class cerification).
Nevertheless, Amchem does not directly endorse what the courts did in Rhone-Poulenc or
Castano, so the conclusion from those cases that the mass tort class action is in jeopardy is itself
premature. But see Richard R. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85
GEo. L.J. 295, 301-09 (1996) (heralding the demise of the mass tort class action on the basis of
cases such as Rhone-Poulenc and the Third Circuit's decision in Amchem).
134 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 519
(1996) (explaining systemic benefits from consolidation of similar litigation).
135 Many authorities have questioned the existence of Article III jurisdiction in settlement
class actions such as Amchem. See, eg., Coffee, supra note 18, at 1422-33 (1995); Note, Back
to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and Limits of Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV.
828, 833 (1996); see also Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244 (describing objection).
13 6
.Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244.
137 The Court intimated its strongest reservations on the question whether exposure-only
claimants without manifest injuries have claims at all, specifically ones that satisfy the
jurisdictional minimum for a diversity class action. See id. at 2244-45 n.15. As noted in the
text, the resolution of this question should depend on whether the applicable state law
recognizes an exposure-only claim. As for the size of the claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may
eliminate the jurisdictional minimum for diversity class members. See sources cited supra note
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be the exposure to a toxic substance as it is to consider the injury to be the
manifestation of disease from the exposure. There is more sense in counting time
for application of statutes of limitations purposes from the date of manifestation,
because many people do not know whether they have been exposed. However,
the result is the same if one characterizes the inapplicability of the limitations bar
as tolling as it is if one calls it non-accrual of the action.
On a more general level, federal courts have always applied case-and-
controversy requirements flexibly, frequently permitting suit when injury is
threatened, or conditioned on an event that has not yet occurred.138 For example,
a long line of Supreme Court precedent allows jurisdiction to challenge a
defendant's practice when the conduct has ceased but the defendant is free of any
court order keeping it from returning to its prior ways. 139 Practical necessity leads
to justiciability, and apart from a class action, there may be no practical way to
achieve finality in mass torts at a reasonable expenditure of judicial and litigant
resources. 140 Moreover, as a professor who served as special master in an
asbestos class action pointed out, the contrary "argument proves too much. If
settlement ended the case or controversy requirement, there could not be consent
settlements or consent judgments in many cases." 141 Default judgments could be
added to the list. The separate question of whether persons whose injuries have
not manifested themselves have a justiciable case is actually a question of
underlying state law, i.e., whether the state considers exposure to a toxic
substance without pathology the accrual of a cause of action.142 The claim would
be fully ripe at least in those states that have not foreclosed a cause of action for
fear of disease, medical monitoring, or the probability of future harm.143
The Court also avoided taking any position on the third issue, the ethical
controversy about settling inventory claims for larger recoveries than those
received by class members who had not previously filed suit. Commentators
138 See ERvIN CHEMERmSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIMrION § 2.1, at 45 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing balance between judicial restraint and necessity to uphold underlying law in
justiciability decisions).
139 See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 635 (1953) (finding case to
be justiciable); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 2.54, at 136-39 (discussing doctrine and
collecting authorities).
140 See Mullenix, Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 635-37.
141 Green, supra note 19, at 796.
142 See id
143 See id. Note that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases that lose as well as those
that win. A case or controversy exists as long as the claim is colorable. Hence, the argument
that the plaintiff should recover under the applicable law for exposure without manifestation
need be no more than non-frivolous. Similarly, the good-faith relinquishment of a doubtful
claim will provide consideration for an enforceable contract of settlement. See RESrATEMENT
2D CONTRACTS § 74, at 185 (1981). Damages have been awarded for mere fear of future
disease after exposure to a toxic product See, e.g., Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1012
(6th Cir. 1993) (holding damages for fear of asbestos disease was proper).
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pressed the ethical objection to an attorney negotiating a deal that provides greater
recovery for clients with cases already on file than that which the attorney
negotiates for absent class member clients whose cases have not yet been filed.144
Because the fixed schedule of damages available to Amchem class members was
so much lower than the damages received by inventory plaintiffs whose cases
were settled at the same time, observers drew the inference that the class members
were being sold out for the benefit of the persons who had already filed suit and
their attorneys. 145
The district court responded to this argument by noting that in the general
practice of personal injury litigation, plaintiffs with cases on file are usually able
to negotiate better deals than similar individuals who have not yet sued: the
plaintiffs have already engaged a lawyer, have usually invested substantial costs,
have a place in the progression towards trial, and have firmer expectations of
recovery.14 6 The court also stressed that obtaining different representation would
have created other, worse problems for the class.147 Because of their experience
with trying and settling asbestos matters, the class counsel were able to present
the most credible negotiating posture to the defendants in settling the class
case.148 The bar of experienced, successful plaintiff asbestos lawyers is limited,
and it is unrealistic to expect its members not to have an inventory of already-filed
cases subject to settlement negotiations.149 The Supreme Court may well have
seen no easy answer to this dilemma and so avoided commenting on it altogether.
D. The Impact of the Decision on Class Action Settlement
Amchem thus left the law of settlement of class actions altered, but in a
somewhat ambiguous way. Settlement class actions are not forbidden. Joinder of
very disparate claims into a large class action is permitted, but the district court
must subclass all groups with divergent interests. At the very least, a court must
144 See Koniak, supra note 20, at 1119-22 (noting the importance of eliminating collusion
in class settlements); see also Cramton, supra note 20, at 832 (advocating courts making
detailed inquiries about side settlements involving future claimants); Issacharoff, supra note 21,
at 832 (citing the risk involved for unrepresented future claimants because settlement was more
tolerable to current claimants).
145 See sources cited supra note 144.
146 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,328 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
147 See id.
148 See id. (stating "[m]oreover, it was the very fact that Class Counsel represented such a
substantial number of present clients, as leaders of the asbestos bar, that made them credible and
appropriate counsel to negotiate on behalf of an inchoate futures class").
149 See Green, supra note 19, at 797-98 (arguing that the years class lawyers typically
spend on claims makes them "knowledgeable and capable lawyers"); see also Deborah R.
Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in
Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1596 (1995) (noting that the
concentration of cases in a few firms is a characteristic of mass tort litigation).
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separate those with current injuries from those whose injuries are not yet
manifest. Subclassed groups of not-yet-manifestly injured persons may be able to
approach the court, but only if their members can receive notice sufficient to
guide their decisions about what to do when there. And there remain serious,
unanswered questions about justiciability of claims of those who have not
manifested injury, and about the ethics of allowing those persons to be
represented by lawyers who also represent persons with current injuries. With
these restrictions on the general applicability of the class action device, settlement
may continue under most of the same standards and procedures as before.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE AMCHEMAPPROACH TO CLASS ACTION
SETrLEMENT
The Amchem Court's approach to class action settlement centers on strict
tests of predominance of common questions and representative adequacy, to be
applied in any class action but especially those that are settled. This approach,
however, risks eliminating useful class action cases though it does not fully
protect the interests of class members. In addition, there are problems with the
Court's theoretical interpretation of the common question predominance and
representative adequacy requirements. Finally, there are also problems with the
practical application of the Court's interpretation to concrete examples of class
action settlements.
A. Difficulties with the Court's Interpretations of Common Question
Predominance and Representative Adequacy
The predominance test sprang from the concem of the drafters of the 1966
Rules amendments that the Rule 23(b)(3) class action joins claims that are more
disparate in nature than the claims handled under other subdivisions of the Rule.
A subdivision (b)(3) class lacks the coherence of a (b)(1) class, in which the
interests of the members are so closely tied that they cannot be treated
differently. 50 The drafters also believed that the interests of (b)(3) class members
were less uniform than those of subdivision (b)(2) class members, who had been
treated the same way by the defendant and who were seeking injunctive relief.151
150 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)-(B).
151 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389-90 (discussing
subdivision (b)(2) and noting purposes of subdivision (b)(3)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee's note (1966) ("Subdivision (b)(3). In the situations to which this
subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those described
above, but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending on the particular facts.").
I have argued elsewhere that this belief was always incorrect with regard to subdivision (b)(2),
and it drifted even further from reality as lawyers used Rule 23(b)(2) in a wide range of
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The drafters believed that if a case fails to meet (b)(1) or (b)(2) standards, class
treatment only serves the interests of uniformity and efficiency when the
questions common to the class predominate over the questions affecting
individual members.152
Considered as a classification to achieve the drafters' purposes, Amchem's
strict interpretation of the predominance test is badly over-inclusive and under-
inclusive. 153 It is over-inclusive in that many cases will meet Amchem's
interpretation of predominance, as well as the other requirements of class
certification, and still be poor candidates for class treatment Even persons with
similar injuries from similar exposure to the same defendant's product may still
have vastly different priorities about the balance between individualized treatment
and speed in the assessment and payment of compensation. Family financial
conditions, availability of collateral sources of compensation, and degree of
psychological aggrievement all vary widely from individual to individual, even
apart from the risk preferences that will be discussed below. A single
representative is not necessarily able to fashion a litigation strategy that will
satisfy these interests, even when common factual or legal issues dominate the
case.
The Amchem interpretation of predominance is under-inclusive in that at least
partial class-action treatment confers advantages of economy, while preserving
fairness interests, in nearly any case in which a large number of plaintiffs sue a
common defendant for exposure to the same product. Rule 23(c)(4) permits a
class to be maintained with regard to a particular issue or issues. Despite the
disparities among the members of a class like Amchem's, there is no reason to
eschew the efficiencies of classwide determinations on such issues as whether a
reasonable finder of fact could determine general causation in the plaintiffs' favor,
or whether the government-contractor defense shields one or another defendant
from all claims. Class treatment may be appropriate for a wide range of discovery
or evidentiary disputes pertaining to particular defendants. The Court should have
placed less stress on the differences among the class members and reserved the
emphasis for the relation between the differences among the class members and
the issues to be decided.
circumstances after 1966. See Weber, supra note 27, at 386-94.
152 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) ("[In subdivision (b)(3)
cases, i]t is only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of
the class action device.").
153 The discussion here is not meant to be an evaluation of constitutionality, but only of
effectiveness. Of course, a similar framework is used in evaluating legislation to determine
whether it satisfies equal protection standards. See GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL.,
CONSTrrIONAL LAW 568-70 (3d ed. 1996); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 370 (1949) (stating such cases raise the problem
of'Justifying the exclusion from the regulation of persons and activities similarly situated but
left untouched"); see also City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(applying framework in equal protection case).
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In a sense, of course, any interpretation of predominance under includes, for
the requirement fails to apply at all in subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions,
though there may be strongly disparate interests among the members of those
classes.154 As discussed below, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) has recently been applied to a
mass asbestos case, even though there was very little evidence that the potential
sum of recovery was fixed and that individual recoveries by some class members
would be dispositive of the claims of others.155 To the extent that applying a
predominance test might have protected class members, the court subverted that
interest by simply bypassing Rule 23(b)(3) and using a different subdivision of
the Rule.156
Weaknesses also exist in the Amchem approach to representative adequacy.
The difficulties mirror those of the Court's treatment of predominance, for the test
assumes that those who were injured in a similar way necessarily have the same
interests and thus can be represented by any of that duly limited cohort. However,
the interests do not necessarily track the injuries, and may well track
considerations that are wholly idiosyncratic. Moreover, the financial pressure on
plaintiffs' lawyers to settle will present a conflict overshadowing those among
injured individuals, even if the representative is drawn from a strictly limited
group.
Any rule or rule interpretation that limits the availability of class actions
places injured plaintiffs at a disadvantage, not just because of the lost economies
of class treatment and the lost leverage from combining claims, but also because
of the problem of queuing. Mass tort injuries are particularly prone to create long
trial queues because the number of cases multiplies rapidly once a few gain
publicity, and the cases, especially those based on occupational exposure,
frequently are geographically concentrated, swamping particular judicial
districts. 157 Defendants contribute to the immediate glut by refusing otherwise
advantageous settlements because they hope to deter future litigation and fear
settlements may bring still more cases out of the woodwork.158
Delay caused by the queue decreases the settlement value of any individual
154 See Weber, supra note 27, at 365-67, 386-87; see also YEAZELL, supra note 26, at
253 ("[U]t is much more likely [in (b)(2) cases] than in (b)(3) cases that the interests of the
group's members will conflict and will be least amenable to abstract assessment.").
155 See In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct 2503
(1997), reaft'd, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998). But see infra text accompanying notes 326-29
(criticizing the Fifth Circuit's position). See generally Marcus, supra note 21, at 878
("Whatever its viability in other cases, the limited find concept does not work well in mass tort
litigation .... Only by the sleight of hand of assuming the desired substantive result... can the
federal court find such a limited fund as a matter of law.").156 See infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
157 See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for
Civil Justie's Research, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 479,495-96 (1987).
158 See id at 496.
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case.159 If the likely delay is infinite, the settlement value drops to zero. The
problem with finite judicial resources, as well as finite resources of expert time,
attorney time, and judicial patience is that queuing time begins to approach
infinity for some plaintiffs: cases may need to wait decades, while the defendants
casually impose continuing litigation costs on the plaintiffs. 160
Class action litigation is a way to bring everyone in the class to the head of
the line, to get a single adjudication for all with no one involuntarily left on a
waiting list.161 In the settlement of a class action, both sides can be expected to
exploit the caseload glut. The plaintiff class representative can threaten a
judgment for all claims that will bring the total impact of recovery home to the
defendant. The defendant, on the other hand, can threaten to oppose class
treatment unless a favorable offer is accepted, knowing that many class members
would settle cheaply to avoid a long delay in any payment through the court
system.162 Quite apart from the burden on the court system stressed by both the
majority and the dissent in Amchem, the crush of asbestos litigation and similar
mass product actions places a burden on each claimant. Class action litigation can
lighten or eliminate that burden, even when the class is less than totally coherent
and the representative less than wholly single-minded. The goal is to find a way
for aggrieved individuals to proceed as a class, yet still be able to protect their
own individual interests.
159 See HANS ZEISELETAL., DELAY INTHECOURT 128 (2d ed. 1978).
160 In one large asbestos consolidation involving a sampling procedure proposed by
plaintiffs for calculating damage awards, the trial judge spoke about the queuing difficulty in
the language of due process:
[A] due process concern remains that is very troubling to the Court. It is apparent from the
effort... to try... 160 cases, [so far,] that unless... some ... procedure that permits
damages to be adjudicated in the aggregate is approved, these cases cannot be tried.
Defendants complain about the 1% likelihood that the result would be significantly
different. However, plaintiffs are facing a 100% confidence level of being denied access to
the courts. The Court will leave it to the academicians and legal scholars to debate vhether
our notion of due process has room for balancing these competing interests.
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
161 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass
Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73
TEX. L. REv. 1647, 1650 ("Aggregation is a problem, but it is one way to prevent a three, five,
seven, or nine-year delay in bringing cases to trial."). As the court stated in Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986), "[i]t seems that the defendants enjoy all of the
advantages ... of the class action-with one exception: the cases are brought to trial."
162 On this point, the Amchem settlement is suspect. The case flow maximums that
Amchem allowed for each disease category replicated the result that the queue would have had
if the individual cases had been litigated to judgment.
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B. Examples ofDifflculties with Settlement Under the Court's Approach
The overriding objection to the Supreme Court's approach as it applies to
settlement is a practical one, based on the experience of litigants and lower courts
with class action settlement. The Court's approach presents a risk that useful
cases will not be brought, and valuable settlements will not be achieved, because
of strict application of the predominance and representative adequacy tests.
Examples include the Silicone-Gel case, the litigation concerning exposure to the
defoliant Agent Orange, and the Dalkon Shield product liability action. It is also
possible to imagine many cases in which the Court's approach will have no
impact, a result that may in itself be unfortunate.
1. The Silicone Gel Implant Case
The settlement in the Silicone Gel case included all manner of injured and
uninjured women who had received implants manufactured by the defendants; it
even included those who had already filed suit.16 3 The class representatives had to
contend with the same conflicting interests found to be present in Amchem. The
older and more severely injured of the class members would logically want large,
immediate payment. The individuals with symptoms more likely to have been
caused by the implants than conditions possibly traceable to other causes would
be more prone to hold out for damages that would approximate those available
from the tort system. Individuals without symptoms would want a fund preserved
to pay for future medical expenses and would probably want a way to get out of
the deal if the funded benefits fell short.
The agreement that the representatives negotiated, however, did a remarkable
job at satisfying the likely interests of the disparate members of the class.164 The
terms did not feature the case-flow maximums of the Amchem settlement, and
provided scheduled benefits to many whose injuries might have been due to
causes other than the implants.165 Persons with unscheduled diseases gained an
additional opportunity to opt out once the diseases occurred.166
Most importantly, the agreement provided for individual choice to take the
deal or not, with none of the notice problems present in the Amchem case. Only
those identified and given notice were to be precluded, and then only if they did
163 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994
WL 114580, at *1-4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) (defining class).
164 See Coffee, supra note 18, at 1404-10 (praising settlement). See generally Marcus,
supra note 21, at 866-71 (contrasting Silicone Gel settlement with the settlement in Amchem
and other cases).
165 See Silicone Gel, No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *8-9 (N.D. Ala. Sept.1,





not exclude themselves from the class.167 Thus the individual could decide for
herself whether, under all the circumstances, the proposal was one she desired to
accept. The compromise even included a later opportunity to opt out if the
defendants' payments to the fund did not provide adequate benefits, albeit with
those later opt-out claimants losing the right to punitive damages.168
Ultimately, the settlement did not go forward as drafted, because so many
individuals filed claims that the likely decreases in benefits levels made the deal
unlikely to be desirable to many class members. In addition, so many claimants
opted out that the deal was no longer desirable for the defendants. 169 Many of the
opt outs were non-United States claimants dissatisfied with the lower benefits
provided them under the settlement. Good grounds existed for lesser benefits to
claimants from overseas: forum non conveniens doctrine might well have kept
them out of United States courts, and the damages available in foreign courts
would have been lower or, in some instances, nonexistent. 170 Nevertheless,
claimants had the choice to make, and many chose to exit. The case thus
illustrates not only the primary point, that attractive settlements can come from
class cases not allowed by Amchem, but also an important secondary point, that
no one but the class member herself can determine what is a good settlement for
her. A tertiary, but also significant, point is that the combination of a good
settlement and adequate notice may cause more people to make claims than the
settling parties anticipate. Therefore, the number of claims may be a better
indication of the quality of the settlement than the process considerations
identified by Amchem.
2. The "Agent Orange" Litigation
Other cases also demonstrate that attractive settlements can come from cases
whose common-question predominance and representative adequacy may not
measure up to Amchem standards. The "Agent Orange" litigation was a mass tort
class action that lumped into one class veterans who had been exposed and
developed symptoms with others who had not manifested illness. The class
members' claims were potentially governed by a variety of different states'
167 See Silicone Gel, 1994 WL 114580, at *2, 11-14 (granting preliminary approval of the
opt out and notice provisions); Silicone Gel, 1994 WL 578353, at *2-6 (granting final approval
of the opt out and notice provisions).
168 See Silicone Gel, 1994 WL 578353, at *7-9 (describing later opt-out rights).
169 See In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 549-53 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (describing
collapse of settlement). Nevertheless, a successor plan has been established which is currently
paying claims. See Vairo, supra note 17, at 110 n.161 (citing newspaper accounts of the
disbursements).
170For a more elaborate discussion of the disparities between domestic and foreign
claimants' abilities to recover in absence of the class action settlement, see Silicone Gel, 1994
WL 578353, at *13-17.
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laws.17 1 Nonetheless, the committee of plaintiffs' lawyers and counsel for the
defendant worked out a settlement that awarded a prospect of significant enough
compensation to 240,000 class members to earn their agreement.172 The
remaining class members were free to continue to litigate, did so, and lost.173
3. The Dalkon Shield Case
The Fourth Circuit's Dalkon Shield case, In re A.H. Robins Co.,174 also
exemplifies a desirable class action settlement that arose from a process rejected
by Amchem. Although by the time of final disposition the matter was under
supervision of a bankruptcy court and so resembled a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) case
somewhat more than a subdivision (b)(3) class action,175 the class of creditors
whose cases were settled included a group of 195,000 women who claimed injury
from use of the device. 176 The court did not create separate subclasses for
claimants with greater and lesser injuries or diseases of particular kinds, nor did it
appoint separate representatives for individuals with various sorts of
symptoms. 177 Nevertheless, the $2.475 billion settlement earned the support of
171 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1987)
(also holding that settlement was reasonable).
172 See id. at 171. It appears that without the intervention of the district judge, pushing the
plaintiffs' committee to take $180 million, the defendants' offer would have been an even more
generous $200 million. See PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 159 (1986). On the
other hand, if before the settlement the district judge had issued the same decision on the merits
that he ultimately did, there would have been no recovery at all.
173 See In re "Agent Orange, Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
174 The case has two relevant reported opinions, both with the title "In re A.H. Robins
Co.," 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming certification of class and approval of settlement)
and 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirrning various anti-suit injunctions). Also of interest is an
opinion of the same title interpreting alternative dispute resolution provisions of the settlement.
See In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that ADR rules places the
burden of proving causation upon plaintiff). The Supreme Court in Amchem went out of its way
to list A.H. Robins as one of the cases that had erroneously relied on the existence of the
settlement in determining the appropriateness of class treatment of the case. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997).
175 The Fourth Circuit was persuaded that one aspect of the case concerning the liability of
an insurer led to proper certification of the class under subdivision (b)(1)(A), on the ground that
risks of inconsistent adjudication existed with regard to the insurer's liability. See A.H. Robins,
880 F.2d at 742.
176 SeeA.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 697.
177 Professor Vairo, who serves as chair of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, recognized
this fact in her article describing the Trust's successful operation. See Vairo, supra note 17, at
159 ( In any event, the Dalkon Shield litigatiori, the asbestos litigation, and now the tobacco
litigation all raise the kind of conflict of interest considerations discussed by the Supreme Court
in Amchemn.').
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94% of the 139,605 claimants who voted on the plan.178 Most significantly, the
settlement provided an individual component of choice beyond the group-voting
procedure. Once the compensation system went into operation, if the claimant
chose not to accept an individually tailored offer from a dispute resolution facility,
she could elect ajury trial or arbitration. 179
The Silicone Gel, "'Agent Orange," and Dalkon Shield settlements were good
settlements in that they offered large, immediate, relatively certain recovery to all
claimants with significant injuries and a good likelihood of causation, while
making plaintiffs with weaker claims no worse off than they would be in the tort
system. But more important than the attractiveness of the settlements in the
estimation of academic observers, or the judges who would otherwise have tried
the cases, is the reality that in each case the class members were afforded the
opportunity to accept or reject the settlement. 180 Each individual could weigh the
merits of accepting the deal or refusing it. This element of choice goes far to
redeem whatever flaws the Amchem Court might have identified in the framing of
the cases and their settlement proposals.
4. Implications of the Examples
The three previously discussed cases are all mass tort actions, chosen because
Amchem's implications are clearest for cases that resemble it on the facts. The
impact of the case on the settlement of consumer or securities cases may be less
178 See A H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 698. Because the claimants constituted a class of
creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding, the disposition was put to a vote. See id. at 697-98.
179 See id. at 744. The court commented that the provision "is everything'that an express
opt-out provision could give a class member if such a right is required under due process." Id. at
745. A number of incentives operated to induce claimants to opt for compensation
determinations other than jury trial. See generally Vairo, supra note 17, at 123-56 (describing
the full operation of the trust).
180 As noted, there were some differences among the cases on the timing and content of
the choice involved. As a bankruptcy matter with a limited fund, the Dalkon Shield case offered
a reduced choice, but one of importance nonetheless. Also worth mentioning, on the topic of
mass tort settlements that appear to be in the class members' interests but were rejected by
Amchem or its reasoning, is In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117
S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaff'd, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Co., 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998), an asbestos exposure class action that bears a close
parallel to Amchem. The settlement in "Asbestos Litigation" provided generous compensation
for at least some class members, although the defendant demanded global peace before parting
with 1.535 billion dollars of insurance assets and so insisted on a mandatory class. See generally
Green, supra note 19, at 798-99 (describing settlement). Had the class not been mandatory, the
case would have been a settlement that many class members would likely have endorsed.
However, its satisfaction of subsections 23(a) and (b) was likely identical, or perhaps weaker,
than Amchem's. Nevertheless, the court's treatment of the case as a mandatory class action
under Rule 23(b)(1), which restricted the class members from accepting or rejecting the
settlement individually, certainly is objectionable. See infra text accompanying notes 326-29.
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severe, but the impact on employment cases could more closely resemble the
impact on tort matters. In employment cases, interests of different workers
frequently diverge, and some courts have found it convenient to retreat from a
strict application of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,181 which the Amchem
Court relied upon so heavily.182 Many employment actions are brought under
Rule 23(b)(2), which does not have a common-question predominance
requirement, but application of subdivision (b)(2) to those cases remains a
debatable matter.183 Furthermore, the representative adequacy standard, which
applies fully to (b)(2) classes, could still create difficulties. As I have argued
previously, subdivision (b)(2) actions should either have (b)(3)-type rights of
notice and opt out, or they should not have preclusive effects. 184 Nevertheless,
raising standards relating to the presence of common questions and representative
adequacy is not the way to achieve fairness and efficiency in these cases.
Deterring the initiation and settlement of employment class actions would be a
significant, unintended, negative consequence of heightening the standards of
common question predominance and representative adequacy.
Amchem's marginal negative impact on the initiation of federal mass tort
cases is, admittedly, not a wholly bad thing. As I have argued elsewhere,
consolidated mass tort cases are better sited in the state courts, for reasons of
federalism and efficiency. 185 But if the mass tort cases are to be consolidated in
the federal courts, class action treatment does lend efficiency, and good
settlements should not be impeded. Moreover, Amchem will inevitably have a
negative effect on mass tort class actions in the state courts, making them more
difficult to bring and to settle. The effects will appear immediately in those states
whose class action rules or statutes mimic Federal Rule 23, but even states
applying other formulas will need to weigh whether the Supreme Court might
interpret the due process clause to require what the Court believed Rule 23
does.186 To avoid that difficulty, state courts may interpret their rules in
181 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982) (holding that single class could not contain both
employees who were denied promotion and applicants denied employment).
182 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2250 (1997); see also
Downs, Impact, supra note 112, at 708-10 (criticizing courts for failing to follow precedent of
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon).
183 For an influential exploration of this topic, see George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and
Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11, 25-27 (1983) (discussing certification
of employment cases under 23(b)(2)).
184 See Weber, supra note 27, at 400-03. A recent decision reversing a district court's
granting of opt-out rights in a subdivision (b)(2) settlement is Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227,
234-37 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding district court abused its discretion).
185 See Weber, State Courts, supra note 16, at 220-59.
186 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985), the Court
interpreted due process to impose procedural safeguards in state-court, multi-state class actions
for monetary relief that are identical to the safeguards found in Rule 23(b)(3). Amchem's
chilling effects on state court class certification have already appeared. See Ford v. Murphy Oil
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accordance withAmchem's reading of Rule 23.
5. A Non-Example: Coupon Settlements
Although the Supreme Court's approach will make some desirable
settlements less likely, it will have no practical effect on coupon settlements,
which have been the subject of much criticism in recent years.187 These
settlements have been used in consumer fraud and other cases in which the real
damages sustained by most class members are low, and the cost of litigating any
particular claim is higher than the individual recovery. A coupon for a discount on
a future purchase is provided in full satisfaction of the class member's non-
personal injury claim over a defective or unlawfully marketed product. 88
Although the settlements purport to have an astronomical monetary value,189
accurate valuation is frequently impossible because of the prevalence of other
discounts and marketing devices. 190 Moreover, customers frequently lack the
ready cash to make use of coupons for future purchases,' 91 transfer of coupons
usually is difficult, 192 and many disenchanted consumers would never buy the
same product, or even a different product from the same company, at any price.
Nevertheless, in some instances, accepting the coupon for a later purchase
U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 551 (La. 1997) (reversing certification on grounds that no
common questions predominated over individual issues); State ex rel. Byrd v. Chadwick, 956
S.W.2d 369, 388-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (remanding for new notice, though largely on
authority other than Amchem). But see Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life after Amchem: The Class
Struggle Continues, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 377-78 (1998) (acknowledging Ford, but
contending that state courts will emerge as forum of choice for mass tort class actions in wake
of Amchem).
187 See generally Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810 (1996)
(citing cases and critical commentary on coupon settlements). The leading case in the federal
courts is In re General Motors Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d
768, 800-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that courts are required to make findings that the rules
governing class certification have been met, regardless of whether it was certified for settlement
purposes). Some aspects of General Motors would need modification in light of Amchem. See
Amchem, 117 S. Ct at 2243 (discussing General Motors decision); see also id. at 2248 (finding,
contrary to the Third Circuit approach, that a class action certified for settlement need not be
suitable for trial management).
18 8 See sources cited supra note 187.
189 In General Motors, one expert testified that the value of the coupons given to settle
non-personal injury claims regarding allegedly unsafe fuel tanks was between $1.98 and $2.18
billion, but the expert's estimate that between 34% and 38% of the class would use the coupon
was contrary to a telephone survey showing only 14% would probably or definitely do so. See
In re General Motors, 55 F3d at 807.
190 See id at 807-08.
191 See id. at 808.
192 See, e.g., id. at 809 (discussing transfer options in General Motors).
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may be a rational decision for a given class member,193 even when the proposal
for the settlement originated in a case lacking predominance of common issues
and having a questionable representative. The class member may be about to
purchase the item the coupon discounts and would prefer a larger discount to a
smaller amount in cash. For that class member, it makes more sense to accept the
deal than to hold out for the prospect of less value from the litigation. A class
member who feels that way should be permitted to act on the inclination. What is
needed is a rule that would permit those class members to accept the settlement,
without forcing such a deal on those customers who would never go near the
product again.
V. A CONSENT-BASED APPROACH TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
A new approach to the settlement of class actions, one that the Amchem Court
did not consider, would place its emphasis on the idea of individual consent. The
approach would not minimize the importance of common questions and
representative adequacy in the framing of the class action, but it would stress the
far more important question of whether the individual class member has the
opportunity to accept or reject the settlement. Consent should matter; the consent
that matters should be meaningful consent; implied consent is no substitute for
real choice; and the practical effects of requiring choice will be beneficial.
A. The Importance of Consent
Choice is good. Affording choice confers dignity upon those permitted to
choose, as does an ordinary opportunity to make or refuse to make a contract. Sir
Henry Maine observed in 1861 that the movement of progressive societies has
been one "from status to contract," 194 a development that allows the exercise of
economic power, but also affords the freedom to accept or reject an exchange
rather than having that decision made by someone else.195 This capacity to
choose is an important aspect of humanity and has value in itself.19 6
193 Coupon settlements have received the approval of appellate courts on the grounds that
they are fair and adequate for class members. See, e.g., Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App.
4th 1794, 1802-04 (1996) (affirming coupon settlement that gave owners of Ford Mustangs
with alleged door defect $400 off purchase price of new car bought within one year). The
contention in the text is not that the settlements are desirable for all class members, or even a
majority, but that they may be desirable for some and that all class members should have the
chance to accept or refuse such a settlement when it is proposed.
194 HENRY MAINE,ANCIENT LAW 182 (Frederick Pollock ed. 1930) (1861).
195 See HAROLD HAViNGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACr 37, 42 (1961)
(discussing relationship of power and freedom of choice in the formation of contracts).
196 See SIDNEY HOOK, POLmCAL POWER AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 67-68 (1959)
("Whether our choices are good or bad, wise or foolish, we feel diminished as human beings if
we are prevented from making them. Denied freedom to make choices, we are denied
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Moreover, with regard to settlement of class actions, only choice
accommodates the diverse attitudes that litigants have towards risk. The decision
to settle a case depends on a number of factors: the expected gain or loss from the
litigation, the probability of winning or losing, estimates of the cost of litigating,
and the litigant's willingness to risk the loss of the bargain. 197 Whether a
settlement is possible depends upon the overlap of the range of the anticipated
results from the litigation between the defendant and the plaintiff.198 Whether a
settlement occurs when the overlap exists depends partly on bargaining dynamics,
but it also depends on the parties' preferences for risk.199 It is not correct to
assume that a one percent chance of winning $100,000 is worth $1,000, for not
everyone would be indifferent about exchanging one for the other.200 Many
people buy lottery tickets when the probability of winning multiplied by the
jackpot is a tiny fraction of the purchase price. Other people refrain from buying
raffle tickets even when the prize's value multiplied by the chance of winning is
higher than the ticket cost. Risk-averse people simply would prefer to hang onto
what they have, rather than exchange it for a good chance of something better.
Risk-preferring people are just the opposite. Every individual has his or her own
risk preference, and even for a given person, the taste may change over time or
vary with the amounts at stake.201
responsibility, and to deny our responsibility is to deny our humanity.").
197 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 522-28 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing economic model of settlement). One recent source suggests that litigants themselves
are not so rationally behaved, but that lawyers steer their decisions in economically rational
ways. See Russell Korobldn & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997).
198 See POSNER, supra note 197, at 523 (discussing settlement ranges). Another observer
described the idea of a settlement range in the following language:
Except in unusual cases, the area of possible settlement is fairly broad. That is, the
settlement area consists of a wide band of different prices at which it will benefit both
parties to settle. This settlement area is known in economics as the 'cooperative
surplus.' The key point for present purposes is that there is no inherently rational basis
on which to divide the cooperative surplus .... Any division of the cooperative
surplus would meet a standard of 'fair, adequate and reasonable.'
Geoffrey Hazard, The Settlement BlackBox, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1267 (1995).
19 9 See POSNER, supra note 197, at 525 (discussing risk preference or aversion); see also
Resnik, supra note 90, at 854 ("[S]ome ... [litigants] are risk-prone and some risk-averse, some
one-shot players and others repeat players.").
2 0 0 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 & n.29
(2d ed. 1989) ("For example, a risk-averse person, unlike a risk-neutral person, would not be
indifferent between the certainty of winning $5,000 and a 50 percent chance of winning
$10,000. The risk-averse person would, by definition, prefer $5,000 with certainty. Individuals
may also be risk preferring....").
201 Professor Morawetz makes the additional point that individual class members differ in
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Any class settlement, however fair in the abstract, will not be a fair exchange
for those class members who would prefer to take the risk of something better. It
is hardly a valid answer to say that the settlement will correspondingly
overcompensate those who are sufficiently scared of risk that they would have
settled for less. The insistence in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
attorneys obtain the consent of their clients before making any settlement202 bears
witness to the fact that no one can determine what someone else's appetite for risk
will be in any given setting.
The Model Rules' approach to settlement in individual cases is instructive in
other respects for, at its most basic, a class action is one in which a single attorney
represents more than one client in a consolidated case. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct203 and its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility,20 4 have always prohibited a lawyer who represents two or more
clients from making any aggregate settlement of the clients' claims unless each
client consents after full consultation and disclosure. These rules recognize the
importance of allowing the client the last word on whether to accept participation
in a group settlement process. Although class action settlements have been
viewed as an exception to the rule, made on the assumptions of necessity and
homogeneity of interest, neither assumption is necessarily true. In the absence of a
limited fund or other situation covered under Rule 23(b)(1), withdrawal of one or
more class members from the class may be inconvenient, but it is hardly
disastrous. And no matter how homogeneous the class may seem, uniformity of
feelings about settlement cannot be assumed.
Recently, commentators have questioned the wisdom of applying the rule of
disclosure and unanimous consent in the settlement of large-scale group litigation.
Professors Silver and Baker argue that the rule unduly limits the ability of
numerous individuals joined in a case against a powerful defendant to negotiate
an advantageous settlement.205 They contrast the large-scale group case with the
their valuation of particular components of relief. See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class
Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 13-16 (1993).
202 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.").203 See id. at 1.8(g) ("A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims... unless each client consents.. .. ').
204 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImrrY DR 5-106(A) (1981) ("A lawyer
who represents two or more clients shall not make or participate in the making of an aggregate
settlement of the claims... unless each client has consented to the settlement .... ."). One
prominent practitioner, however, has observed that current attomey practices in non-class tort
cases skate on the edge of these rules. See Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on
Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 401-07 (1998)
(discussing aggregated tort cases).
2 05 See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement
Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 733, 767-70 (1997) ('The Rule's non waivable unanimous
consent requirement is probably the most significant barrier to settlement in mass
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class action case, in which the rule of disclosure and unanimous consent does not
apply, and contend that the advantage lies with a procedure in which a single
individual cannot hold up a group settlement.206 They propose alternate
safeguards for individual litigants' interests and suggest that when clients retain
an attorney they should be able to bind themselves to limiting what information
will be disclosed about settlement and adopting a majority or other non-
unanimous voting rule to determine which settlement offer will be accepted.207
Taken on its own terms, the proposal is dubious. True, plaintiffs who are
joined as a group enjoy advantages of economy of scale, enhanced negotiating
leverage, and the ability to conserve the defendant's assets. 20 8 But apart from the
last advantage, which applies only when the defendant's assets constitute a
limited fund, a group whose members can quit has the same benefits. When the
assets are in fact a limited fund, mandatory class action treatment is appropriate,
and a rule of unanimous consent should not apply.
Silver and Baker contend that privacy interests, the ability to offer global
peace (preclusion of all possible claims), and the risk of strategic behavior all
counsel against disclosure and unanimity.20 9 Privacy interests, however, are
subordinate to the need to monitor the group's attorney210 and the group
members' overriding goal of obtaining the maximum recovery. Global peace is a
useful bargaining chip, but one that is overrated.2 1 Finally, in the absence of a
limited fund, strategic behavior is to be applauded, not condemned. It represents
the individual plaintiff striving to obtain the highest recovery for his or her
injuries. If plaintiffs with the most valuable claims reject the settlement (as Silver
and Baker predict at one point in their discussion),212 that is because the
settlement does not afford them adequate compensation in light of the likely
outcome of an individual trial. If plaintiffs with smaller claims reject the
settlement, attempting to squeeze the defendant and other plaintiffs who want to
lawsuits .... ).
206 See id. at 767.
207 See id at 770-78 (arguing the advantages and safeguards of a voting system).
208 Silver and Baker are also correct in contending that agency principles do not require a
rule of unanimity. See id. at 770-73. Nevertheless, for reasons explained in the text, the better
position on the underlying conclusion is that the protection of Rule 1.8 should be nonwaivable.
209 See id. at 750-56.
210 Silver and Baker note the severity of the agency problem for group counsel and
suggest some ways of ameliorating it. See id. at 774-75 (advocating the use of uniform
commission arrangements, such as the standard contingent percentage fee). However, it is
difficult to imagine that any safeguard could work if the clients have all bound themselves to
receive only limited information about the settlement Needless to say, the form of the
agreement will be drafted by the lawyer whose interests will diverge from those of at least some
of the clients.
211 See infra text accompanying note 282.
2 12 See Silver & Baker, supra note 205, at 760.
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wrap up the litigation (as Silver and Baker predict at another point)2 13 the
holdouts' efforts will probably come to nothing. By withdrawing from the group,
small claimants will lose the economies of scale, case-queuing benefits, and
leverage advantages that the combined litigation provides them. Unless the fund
is limited and Rule 23(b)(1)(B) can properly be invoked, the settling parties can
simply call the holdouts' bluff.
Applied to class action cases as a particular subset of group litigation, a
situation that approximates the legal status quo, Silver and Baker's approach is
similarly deficient. Large claimants should be able to hold out for full
compensation, and the defendant that values global peace should have to pay for
the privilege. Strategic behavior works only when the fund is limited. None of the
supposed advantages of a non-unanimity rule outweigh the value of individual
consent. Moreover, consent principles receive even less respect under current
class action procedures than under the Silver and Baker proposal for non-class
group cases. At least the group members would have to agree individually to the
disclosure and voting arrangements before they bring suit, and they would
possess whatever voting power the arrangement gives them. Class action
procedures lack both these protections for the autonomy of the class member.
A number of authorities have argued that due process requires courts to
provide a right to opt out, or at least a right to participate individually, in a class
action lawsuit that will have preclusive effects on the class members.2 14 Although
current due process doctrine would need major reconstruction in order to support
a second, post-certification right to opt out of a proposed settlement,2 15 many of
the same values that stand behind due process rights support individual choice
regarding settlement. Important ideas behind procedural due process in the
litigation context are the individual's property right in a claim for relief,216 and
213 See id at 767.
2 14 The law already provides such a right in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. I have made this
argument, with qualifications, with regard to subdivision (b)(2), but not subdivision (b)(1)
actions. See Weber, supra note 27. Authorities who have argued for a due process right to opt
out of all class actions include: Maximilian A. Grant, The Right Not to Sue: A First Amendment
Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory Class Actions, 63 U. CEi. L. REV. 239, 247-51 (1996)
(arguing that mandatory participation in class action litigation violates freedom of expression
and association under the First Amendment); Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs
Lose Their Constitutional Rights?, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 263, 284-85; Patricia Anne Solomon,
Note, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1627, 1644
(1997). Professor Wooley, as noted below, has argued for a due process right of all class
members to participate in all subdivision (b) class actions. See Wooley, supra note 21 at 611-
15; see also infra text accompanying notes 304-09 (discussing Wooley's thesis).
215 Professor Wooley does make such an argument with regard to the right to opt in and
present one's own case in the class action after rejecting the class settlement. See Wooley, supra
note 21, at 610-19.
216 This idea emerged as early as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950), which concerned the right to notice of a mass proceeding for settlement of
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the right to control the presentation of the claim to the court.2 17 Settlement is a
deprivation of the property right that the class member's claim represents. A court
cannot compel a party to accept a settlement,218 nor preclude others' claims in the
course of accepting someone else' settlement 19 The sole exception to this rule is,
of course, the class action.220 Compelling class members to accept the class
settlement, however, deprives them of the individual right to make their own
decision on the justice of the arrangement.
My proposal to afford class members the individual ability to accept or reject
settlement is hardly without precedent, for it would partially restore the pre-1966
"spurious class action," in which the representative was able to litigate the case to
judgment, binding only the representative and the defendant.2 1 Class members
accounts in a mutual investment scheme. Mullane was crucial to the cases developing due
process doctrine in the 1970s, such as Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971)
(upholding due process right to waiver of filing fee in impoverished person's divorce suit) and
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970) (finding due process right to hearing on claim
for continuing welfare benefits).
2 17 See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85-87 (1988) (finding due process
right to have judgment set aside when process had not been served, even though litigant did not
claim to have meritorious defense). As the Peralta Court stressed, quoting the old case of Coe
v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915), "Where a person has been deprived of
property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, 'it is no answer to say that
in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result.. . ."' Peralta, 485
U.S. at 86-87; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,434-37 (1982) (finding
violations of due process and equal protection in dismissal of plaintiff's employment
discrimination claim because agency failed to process it in time); Societe Intemationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958)
(forbidding loss of suit on basis of discovery noncompliance that litigant had no control over);
Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 20, at 472 ("The right to individual control and
management of one's own personal injury claim is itself a substantive right, indeed perhaps a
constitutional right.").
2 18 See In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding due process protection
for right to reject settlement).
2 19 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,763-69 (1989) (relying on implications of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
220 See Wooley, supra note 21, at 591-92 (criticizing existing doctrine).
221 The term appears to have been coined by Thomas Atkins Street during the era of the
Federal Equity Rules, and referred originally to class actions not involving specific funds or
property in which class members held joint interests. See THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL
EQUITY PRACnCE § 548, at 342-43 (1909). Street gave the example of defendant class actions
against the members of a striking union. See id. at 345 ('This is the 'spurious class action' suit,
the suit brought by or against numerous parties in respect of a personal liability."). The term
"spurious class action" was later used in James William Moore's commentary on Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of 1938. See James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 574-75 (1937) (illustrating the
spurious class with the example of injured property owners who "bring an action on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated," against a railroad that negligently caused a fire).
Examples of cases in which class actions were litigated to judgment, binding only the
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were then permitted to opt in for a share of the relief.2 22 The 1966 Civil Rules
Advisory Committee abolished the spurious class action, adding a provision to
Rule 23 that the judgment in a class action, "whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include" the members of the class, which meant that the judgment would act
as resjudicata for class members' claims.223 As I have detailed elsewhere, the
Committee did so because of misguided ideas that fairness required mutuality of
risk of preclusion. It felt that judgments should bind only when both sides of the
action face mutual preclusion from the action's result.2 24 The Committee failed to
anticipate the important development barely more than a decade later, of
offensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel.225 It also ignored the withering effect
on the importance of mutuality of the decades-old doctrine of non-mutual
defensive preclusion. 226 Although the proposal made in this Article will not
eliminate the preclusive effect on the class of subdivision (b)(3) class actions
litigated to judgment-the 1966 revision's notice, intervention, and opt-out rights
make mutuality of preclusion constitutionally acceptable and probably politically
unassailable-it will allow individual class members to escape the preclusive
representatives, are Fox v. Gliclanan Corp., 355 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding "that a
judgment in such a suit does not bind members of the class who have not become parties"), and
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emps., 183 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1950)
('The general rule in class suits is that the member of the class who is the original plaintiff
retains control over the action as opposed to other[s] ... who may later intervene."). The history
is recounted and sources are collected in Weber, supra note 27, at 395-400; see also YEAZELL,
supra note 26, at 230-32 (providing history and analysis).
222 See, e.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Co. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89 (10th Cir.
1962); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 99 (1945); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 669 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd,
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966)
("Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded; the action will have
been early determined to be a class or non-class action, and in the former case the judgment,
whether or not favorable, will include the class ... ).
224 See Weber, supra note 27, at 372-73, 400, 404 (collecting sources on the advisory
committee's proposal).
225 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (applying offensive
collateral estoppel in stockholders' class action over securities fraud after prior adjudication
against defendants in suit by govemment); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
29 (1982) (codifying Parklane approach). See generally Weber, supra note 27, at 404-05
(discussing collapse of mutuality objection to class actions that bind only the named parties and
the defendants in light of subsequent developments).
226 See Bernhard v. Bank of America, 112 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (applying a looser
standard of mutuality); see also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971) (applying non-mutual preclusion). Jeremy Bentham had proposed
adopting a rule of non-mutual preclusion a century before the Bernhard case. See 7 Jeremy
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (John
Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843). See generally Weber, supra note 27, at 404
(discussing non-mutual defensive preclusion).
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effects of settlements that they do not accept. The result will restore one important
component of freedom of choice that existed in the federal system from 1938 to
1966.
A critic might argue that the choice of the class member to accept the
settlement or to opt out should not be given the gravity it is assigned here because
the choice itself is not a fair one: the class member lacks other choices or is a
single individual confronting a powerful corporate defendant, so there is no room
to bargain and the choice is illusory. This view, however, is fallacious. The take-
it-or-leave-it character of an offer does not render the offer unfair. As many
observers have noted, the local supermarket does not engage in bargaining with
consumers over the price of a loaf of bread, but that is no reason to void the
purchase.22 7 A uniform set of terms offered to all members of a group not only
reduces the transaction costs that individual bargains would create,2 2 8 but also
generates consumer surplus by forcing the offeror to make the terms attractive
enough to generate an optimal number of acceptances, even when some of those
making up the number would have settled for less.229 Of course, the defendant is
in the position of a monopolist (more accurately, a monopsonist, for it is buying
the class member's claim rather than selling the person compensation),230 but to
an important extent, so is the individual, for no one is competing with the class
member for the sale of the claim.2 31
227 See, e.g., John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 239
(1942) ("I agree to pay ten cents for a loaf of bread, not because I want to give the baker ten
cents, but because that's the only way I can get the bread."); see also ROGER FISHER Er AL.,
GET INGTO YES 141-42 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing appropriate use oftake-it-or-leave-it offers).
22 8 See M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine oflnequality ofBargaining Power, 26 U. TORONTO
L.J. 359,364 (1976) ("If an agreement had to be negotiated and drafted from scratch every time
a relatively standard transaction was entered into, the costs of transacting for all parties involved
would escalate dramatically.").
229 See C.E. FERGUSON & S. CHARLES MAURiCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 129 (rev. ed.
1974) (defining consumer's surplus as the area below a demand curve and above the market
price). Actually, the surplus here might more properly be termed "producer surplus," for the
claimant is selling the claim to the defendant, but the class of plaintiffs will realize a surplus
because the defendant is the one that must make a uniform offer to a large group in order to
maximize its utility in the market for preclusion. Cf id. at n.9 (discussing producer's surplus).
230 In a given market, a monopolist, or single seller, or a monopsonist, or single buyer,
will be able to exact a better bargain than would a seller or buyer who must compete against
others. See id. at 280-81 (describing monopoly), 369-70 (describing monopsony).
231 This point needs the "to an important extent" qualification, because if the individual
claims are small enough or the holdouts few enough, the scattered resistance may not make any
difference to the defendant, and so the class members will be competing against themselves to
be among the sufficiently large fraction of the group that will be adequate to satisfy the
defendant's need for not-quite-global peace. Nevertheless, in a small-claims class, the threat to
make a new class out of the holdouts may restore a semi-monopolistic balance, and the
holdouts in larger-claim mass tort actions will be no worse off bargaining against the defendant
than they would have been had no class action ever been brought On the other hand, when the
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As this analysis suggests, an agreement to settle a lawsuit is simply a
contract. One item of value-the ongoing claim of the class member to judicial
relief-is traded for another-cash, coupons, or a promise by the defendant to
change its behavior. Freely chosen settlements thus confer the benefit of
increasing the well-being of those who accept them and cause social benefit by
directing resources towards their most valuable use.232 But this advantage applies
only when the contracting parties make their own choices, not when a court or
self-appointed representative makes the choices for them.
B. Prerequisites ofMeaningful Consent
Consent, of course, is not consent at all unless the person making the decision
knows to what he or she is agreeing. For that to happen, the class member must
receive adequate notice of the settlement and have adequate time to reflect on the
decision to accept or reject the settlement. Notice of the decision entails an
adequate description of the settlement and its effects so that the person can make a
choice that will maximize individual well-being. Courts have frequently declared
that notice is a critical component of due process when courts or other
government powers make individualized decisions affecting liberty or property
interests.233 Moreover, they have stressed that effective notice requires more
strenuous measures than a mere gesture at informing individuals about the
pendency of court proceedings. 234
In the ordinary situation of an attorney negotiating a settlement for a client,
the attorney is obliged to provide the client with the factual information relevant
to the matter, to inform the client of what the opposing party has communicated,
and to take other reasonable steps to permit the client to make a sensible decision
to accept or reject any offer of settlement.235 The information needed for the
defendant needs, for reasons of its own, to have a complete settlement of all claims, individuals
may be able to exploit their position to a considerable degree by threatening to upset the entire
settlement by holding out. This problem will be most acute in limited fund or other true (b)(1)
suits, which is why those cases are dealt with separately in my proposal.
2 32 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOmCS OF CONTRACT
LAw 1-2 (1979) ( By making both [persons agreeing to an exchange] better off, the exchange
will also increase the wealth of the society (of which they are members) ... ."); Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 817 (1941) ("[Tjhe social utility of the
contract is guaranteed in some degree by the fact that it emerges as a compromise
of... competing interests.").
233 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); see also Peralta v. Heights Med.
Ctr., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988) ("Failure to give notice violates 'the most rudimentary demands of
due process of law."' (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965))).
234 See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)
("But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.").
235 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.4 cmt. 1 (1983) ("A lawyer
who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement ... should promptly inform the
19981
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
decision may include jury awards in comparable cases, as well as other matters
affecting any damages awarded at trial, such as the chances of winning or losing
if the claim were to go to trial, any potential problems with insolvent defendants if
collection is delayed, and the impact of potential tax and subrogation liabilities.236
Frequently, the lawyer must obtain information through discovery or other means
to discharge the responsibility to give the client the facts on which to make a
sensible decision whether to settle.2 37
The reality that members of a class will not be making an affirmative
statement of agreement to the settlement, but simply failing to return a slip of
paper asking about exclusion, should increase the attention paid to the form and
content of the notice.2 38 In ordinary circumstances an individual's silence or other
failure to act does not amount to acceptance of a settlement or other contract.2 39
client of its substance... .'); see also id. Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.'). The Preamble to the Model Rules states: "As advisor, a lawyer provides a
client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains
their practical implications'" Id. at pmbl. para. 2. Various authorities have discussed the civil
liability of a lawyer who fails to provide adequate information to a client to permit the client to
make a wise decision about a course of legal action. See Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in
the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Cornelius J. Peck, A New Tort
Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REV. 1289 (1984); see also
Amy Owen, Commentary, May a Lawyer Agree with the Client That the Lawyer Must Approve
All Settlements?, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 311, 314 (1992) ("[M]ost importantly, a client needs
particular information concerning settlement so that he can make an informed decision. Since
there is a duty to inform the client in certain situations, the failure to do so may subject the
lawyer to criticism, discipline, and malpractice liability.").
23 6 See Peck, supra note 235, at 1298.
237 See, e.g., Grayson v. Wofsey, 646 A.2d 195, 197 (Conn. 1994) (malpractice liability
for failure to use diligence to discover information about marital property in divorce action);
Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107 (Nev. 1995) (malpractice action over settlement of accident
case). These cases are discussed in Hazard, supra note 198, at 1263 n.25. Other relevant cases
include: Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App. 1966) (negligent failure to
determine value of marital property); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986)
(liability for failure to make adequate case preparation before settlement); Collins v. Perrine,
778 P.2d 912 (N.M. App. 1989) (same). But see Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna,
Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991) (barring malpractice claim for
inadequate preparation when client agreed to settlement). See generally Kristine Heim Marino,
Recent Decision, The "Lawyer's Holiday:" For Victims of Legal Malpractice, Justice Goes on
Vacation, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 771, 771-85 (1992) (discussing Muhammad case and contrary
authority).
23 8 See Marcus, supra note 21, at 889 (asking "whether people who may be relinquishing
the right to go to court to recover damages for life-threatening personal injuries understand what
they are doing").
2 3 9 See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJiYANNAKIs BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs
§ 3.18, at 402 (rev. ed. 1993) ("It is certain that, if the only facts are that A makes an offer to B
and B remains silent, there is no contract.").
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Greater efforts to call the details of the settlement to a person's attention ought to
apply when the rules lower the standard for what the class member needs to do to
accept the deal.
Notice entails identifying everyone who ought to receive the notice, and this
is where the Amchem class falls down. As the Supreme Court recognized, many
members of the class were incapable of identification because they would enter it
only by becoming spouses or dependents of the other class members in the
future.240 Even those persons who could be identified as having been exposed to
asbestos in the past, or likely to have been, were in no position to appreciate the
gravity of the settlement decision when they had not yet manifested any kind of
symptoms from the exposure.241 Effectively, consortium claims of individuals
who cannot now be identified have to be placed beyond the reach of
settlement.242 If preclusion of these claims in the absence of litigation is necessary
for some other social goal, Congress will need to impose it.24 3 And symptom-
free, exposure-only occupational plaintiffs are highly unlikely to be capable of
adequate notification.
On the other hand, individuals with symptoms are at the stage where, in this
litigious society, they certainly will have thought of legal redress. A carefully
designed notice could provide fair process to them, even if they have not yet filed
lawsuits of their own.244 Finding those individuals requires the same steps that the
district court used in Amchem. The Supreme Court had no serious quarrel with the
notice program with respect to that group.
The content and form of the notice matter as much as the identification of the
240 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997); see also supra
text accompanying notes 113-15 (discussing Supreme Court's comments regarding notice).
241 See sources cited supra note 240.
242 Although the inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, the question also exists
whether obtaining a litigated result would comport with due process to a group that is
physically incapable of learning of the effects of the litigation on their interests. See generally
Elizabeth R. Kaczynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Actions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 397, 401-18 (1985) (criticizing class definitions that include
persons whose causes of action will arise in the future). In any instance, a settlement of those
individuals' claims violates essential ideas of consent.
243 Numerous authorities have proposed legislative solutions to the problem of asbestos
and other mass tort litigation, and in Amchem, the Supreme Court joined the chorus. See
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2238; Nagareda, supra note 18; Nagareda, supra note 133; Weinstein,
supra note 18, at 565; see also UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 33-34 (1991) (cited in
Amchenz, 117 S. Ct. at 2238).
244 Professor Hensler's research suggests that publicity in mass tort cases, including
individualized notice, leads to two to three times greater use of the legal system than occurs
among victims of other, possibly compensable product injuries. See Hensler, supra note 149, at
1599 ("[P]ublicizing the possible link between product use and injuries and the availability of
legal remedies-whether through mass media coverage, lawyer advertising, or court-ordered
notices-results in a large increase in the number of claims that are filed.").
1998] 1203
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
class. Although an economically rational class member might invest money or
time in seeking out the information, in small-claim classes the disparity between
the cost of doing so and the value of the individual claim is such that the class
member is unlikely to make the effort.245 Even in larger-claim mass torts, where
the amount of the recovery may justify considerable expenditures on information,
there is no good reason to have each class member or that individual's attorney
invest in efforts duplicative of those made by others. Careful attention on the part
of the class representative and the court to the wording and design of the notice
spreads the cost of a single effort over the entire class (and, because the judge is
involved, the taxpaying public). Information about prior settlements (if known) or
trial results in individual litigation of similar tort cases will be crucial data and
ought to be included in the notice. Of course, the individual will need to invest the
money to determine whether, because of the facts of that person's particular
claim, the settlement offer is an advantageous one.
The transmittal of information is a basic obligation of a lawyer to a client 246
and lawyers are charged with even higher than usual information disclosure
responsibilities when there are potential conflicts of interest among multiple
clients they represent. The Model Rules prohibit lawyers from representing
clients whose interests are adverse unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the
representation of one will not affect that of the other, and each client consents
after consultation. 247 The Official Comment emphasizes the importance of the
information disclosure, providing that if one client refuses to consent to disclosure
needed to permit the other to make an informed decision about representation, the
lawyer cannot even ask the uninformed client to consent to representation2 48
The information that should go to the individual class members at the time of
acceptance or rejection of the settlement is similar to the information that the
parties would be presenting to the judge in fairness hearings typically held
pursuant to Rule 23(e).249 The point is to get this information to the class
members for them to use to decide to opt out or stay in, not to hold on to the
information until the fairness hearing. It is too late then: the information never
gets to the people who should be making individual decisions based on it.
Attorneys' fees information should also be included in the notice, for fee
245 Cf Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.
2053, 2121 (1995) (discussing the economic benefits of securities action class members'
investments in monitoring the class representatives and their attorneys).
246 See Gary A. Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lawyer's Duty to Keep Clients
Informed, 9 PACE L. REV. 391, 391 (1989) (describing attorneys as "in the business of
providing information to their clients").
247 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7(a) (1983).
248 See Id. at cmt. 5.
249 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3D § 30.41 (1995) (discussing information
relevant to fairness hearings).
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arrangements would surely matter to an individual plaintiff contemplating
settlement of an individual suit. The fees information ought to be understandable,
just as it must be in an ordinary agreement between client and lawyer.250 When
self-interest in fee arrangements may affect a lawyer's professional judgment, the
lawyer faces professional discipline for failing to provide full disclosure to the
clients.251 This condition necessarily applies when class counsel is being paid out
of the settlement proceeds or in a separate payment from the defendant.
Fee information was the missing, crucial ingredient in the notice of opt-out
rights and settlement in the Hoffman v. BancBoston252 litigation in Alabama. The
case was a class action concerning overcharges against escrow accounts. Much to
their chagrin, class members who failed to opt out of the case found that under the
settlement their escrow accounts were billed attorneys' fees nine or more times
the amount of monetary relief they received. 253 Apparently, the court awarded a
contingency fee that was calculated as a fraction of the total returnable amounts
held in escrow rather than the increments in the amounts actually caused by the
settlement.2 54 Of course, had the class members been informed that they would
lose more in attomeys' fees than they would gain in money damages, they would
have opted out,255 and even those few who would not have paid attention to an
adequate notice would have been protected by the court's likely reaction to
massive refusals of the settlement.256
Many authorities have questioned the effectiveness of class action notice,
250 The Model Rules provide that the basis of the fee has to be communicated to the client
at or near the beginning of the representation. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.5(b) (1983). Contingent fee agreements have to be in writing and give specific
information about how fees are determined and expenses calculated, and they must directly
state the percentage of the recovery that the lawyer will receive in the event of settlement. See
id. at Rule 1.5(c).
251 See People v. Schmad, 793 P.2d 1162, 1163 (Colo. 1990) (suspending attorney for,
among other things, failing to disclose to the client a possible conflict of interest on the part of
the attorney regarding the amount and payment method for a structured settlement).
252 The case is unreported. For a description, see Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92
F.3d 506, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
253 See id.
254 See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1063-68 (1996) (describing settlement).
255 'Me class members were really unwitting members of a Rule 23(b)(3)-type defendant
class. Had they known what was going on, they would have acted to avoid liability by dropping
out. It is precisely the anticipation of this dynamic that has rendered the defendant class device
generally ineffective. See Willging et al., supra note 1, at 120 (finding only one certified
defendant class action in study of 152 class actions in four federal judicial districts).
256 The Koniak and Cohen article describes potential common law and statutory remedies
against the attorneys for their conduct in the case and criticizes the Seventh Circuit's rejection
of liability in follow-up litigation. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 254, at 1102-1269
(discussing bases of liability), 1270-80 (discussing Kamilewicz).
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frequently citing the silly responses that some individuals make when they
receive the forms. 257 A crucial part of the problem is that the notices are drafted in
legalese, so it is no mystery that many recipients misunderstand them. The
problem can be solved by better, more sensitive drafting.258 The other possible
cause of the problem is that some recipients of the notice simply cannot be
bothered to take the time to understand the form or take it to someone who can.
Although this point may be correct for small-claims cases,259 it is very dubious
for larger-scale mass torts cases. Many of those individuals will already have their
own attorneys, if they have sufficient likelihood of exposure and injury to appear
on the list to be notified of the case. If they do not, the notice should urge them to
consult a lawyer, and that person will be able to give a disinterested evaluation of
the case, perhaps consulting modem, widely-used verdict reporter databases. Of
course, if enough individuals reject the settlement, the deal is likely no longer to
be attractive to the defendant and will need to be renegotiated. Even if the
defendant wants to maintain the agreement and deal with the opt outs separately,
a high number of opt outs may be grounds for the court to conclude that the
settlement is insufficient or to doubt representative adequacy.
C. The Dfficulties with Relying on Implied Consent
One might argue that consent may safely be assumed when the stakes are
small and the interests of the class members are clearly identical, as in most
consumer or securities class actions. But even in that situation, the choice to settle
or to litigate depends not only on the strength of the claim, but also on the taste for
taking risks. The former may be uniform throughout the class, but the latter most
assuredly is not. The interest in guaranteeing meaningful consent may also be
weaker in some (b)(2) cases because of the uniformity of interests of class
members, although the interests of the system in affording class-wide preclusion
for defendants are weaker. Moreover, the smaller the claim, the less incentive any
class member has to monitor the attorney.260 Resistance to the settlement on the
part of class members is a more effective check on attorney overreaching than
court review is likely to be.
One might also argue class members who fail to opt out at the class
certification stage of a class action should have no right to make a second election
257 See, e.g., Arthur Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313,
322(1972).
2 5 8 See DEBORAH RHODE, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN EDUCATIONAL REFORM LrIGATIoN
31-32 (1982) (describing potential improvements of class notice).
259 If it is true, it is simply an illustration of the point that the recipient's time is more
valuably spent doing something other than deciphering the notice. If that in turn is true, then the
court system need not preoccupy itself with heroic efforts to maximize that person's recovery.
The person has been afforded the choice and has chosen to do nothing.
260 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 245, at 2064-65.
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to accept or reject the settlement that the class representative arrives at. There are
two responses to this position. First of course, not all class actions afford notice
and an opportunity to opt out at the certification stage: only subdivision (b)(3)
cases that are not brought as settlement class actions afford these rights.261 Choice
of whether or not to settle is equally important in cases that will have preclusive
effect but are primarily for equitable relief and thus fall under subdivision
(b)(2).262 Unless the equitable relief consists of conduct that must be identical
with regard to all members of the class in order to be legally permissible,2 63 the
class members' personal freedom and preferences for risk should be
accommodated in non-cash cases just as they ought to be in cases brought for a
money judgment.264
Second, it is incorrect to assume that the willingness to accept representation
by the class representative and her attorney constitutes willingness to settle on
whatever terms they arrange. Current class action law recognizes this fact by
providing for a settlement fairness determination by the district judge,265 but for
reasons explained above, that determination is no substitute for individual choice.
Even the free choice of an attorney and the personal designation of that individual
as an agent to negotiate settlement is not a delegation of the authority to settle the
case. The Model Rules make the distinction perfectly clear: settlement is a
decision reserved for the client not to be decided by the attorney, no matter how
competent or selfless the attorney. The client must explicitly give authority to
settle.266 Good reason underlies the rule. No matter how skillful the representative
may be at comparing the settlement to the predicted outcome of the litigation, no
human being can know another's willingness to take a risk that the outcome will
be better.267 Moreover, reserving the choice for the client reinforces the basic
principle that the client retains human autonomy despite being assisted by a
261 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
262 See Weber, supra note 27, at 385-94.
263 In such a situation, the class should be deemed a (b)(1) class, just as it should be in
instances in which a holdout can obtain a larger share of a fixed pie simply by being a holdout.
In these instances, individual consent need not be obtained, but the Rule 23(a) requirements
should be enforced strictly. See infra text accompanying notes 321-29.
264 See Weber, supra note 27, at 385-94 (contending that due process requires notice and
opt-out rights in (b)(2) actions that have preclusive effects). The due process argument in favor
of notice and opt-out rights at time of settlement may not be as strong as that supporting notice
and opt out at some point before final disposition, for the failure to opt out in response to the
class certification might be viewed as tacit consent to settlement, at least if the class member is
wamed of this possibility. Nevertheless, prudential considerations still counsel provision of
notice and opt-out rights at time of settlement.
2 65 See FED. L CIV. P. 23(e).
26 6 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESsIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1983).




D. Practical Effects ofRequiring Individual Consent
The effective result of requiring individual consent for class action
settlements will be clearer and more limited class definitions so as to allow for
adequate notice; otherwise, settlement classes or other cases that reach
compromise early in the litigation will be permissible.2 69 Likewise, less
cohesiveness in the class than what Amchem tolerated will be permissible. Apart
from the individual consent requirement, the status quo ante Amchem will be
restored. However, notice should be improved: class members need to get more
information, and have to be urged to contact their own attorneys in all cases
involving potentially significant relief, such as toxic torts. There will be added
costs of a second notice in cases that settle after certification, but these costs are
subject to negotiation between the named plaintiffs and the defendant.270
The attorneys for individual class members would probably opt more of them
out and launch more follow-up classes than now. Costs of individual litigation
and the queue for hearings place some limits on that conduct, nevertheless. 271 If
the representative in the initial class action is later found to have conferred
strategic benefits on the follow-up plaintiffs by developing facts or establishing a
model settlement, that person should have a claim against the opt outs for some
share of attorneys' fees. 272
26 8 See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
269 Settlement, at any stage of the litigation, is not inherently suspect. "The notion that
parties cannot justly settle personal injury claims is absurd, unless one takes the position that
parties lack the capacity to contract concerning their own interests." Hazard, supra note 198, at
1259.
270 The costs are not insurmountable. Multiple notices have been provided to class
members in mass tort cases for a variety of reasons, including large numbers of failed
responses, see Vairo, supra note 17, at 149 (describing Dalkon Shield litigation), and
misconduct by claimants' attorneys, see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-
0215, 1995 WL 561297, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1995) (describingAmchem notice).
271 See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
272 The possibility of shifting some of the fees or costs from the class action to the
holdouts is the best way to deal with the potential free rider who opts out of a settlement but still
wishes to take advantage of the extensive case development undertaken by the class
representative's attorney in litigating or in bargaining for his or her own settlement. Cf. Roger
Furman, Note, Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by Persons Opting Out of a Class
Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1190-91 (1980) (arguing that persons who opt out of a class
should be permitted to use offensive, non-mutual collateral estoppel only when their individual
interest in controlling their own litigation is so strong they would opt out regardless of their
right to use collateral estoppel). Because this approach accommodates individual choice, it is
infinitely better than the proposal to limit opt-out rights in order to reduce free riders. A limit on
opt-out rights is proposed in Mark W. Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group
Litigation: Requiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a
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Class members who do not accept the proposed settlement may choose to file
their own individual actions, or any one of them may file a follow-up class action
comprising all those who rejected the settlement. The statute of limitations
applicable to their claims should toll during the pendency of the first class action,
in accordance with current law.273 Of course, those who choose the risky course
of refusing a proffered settlement will have to live with the consequences of their
decisions. In the "Agent Orange" litigation, class members who did not accept
the settlement offered by the defendant chemical companies continued to litigate
their tort claims, only to see them fail on grounds of causation and the
govemment-contractor defense.2 74
Beyond these specific predicted consequences, the general effects of the
consent-based approach include potential problems of identifying class members
to obtain consent and of erecting insurmountable obstacles to settlement, in
particular, the disincentive for defendants to agree to a deal that may not include
all plaintiff class members.
1. Identification Problems
In some class actions, it is difficult to identify the class members so as to
provide them notice and ask them whether they accept the proposed settlement.
Therefore, this proposal may act as an impediment to the settlement of these
cases. 275 The proposal here, however, is meant to apply only to settled class
actions and only to those in which the settlement will bind the class members. It
does not entail an endorsement of those cases that have required the precise
identification of all persons who fit into a class or would be entitled to relief upon
adjudication. Critics have rightly questioned whether it makes any sense to deny
class status in cases such as the Seventh Circuit's Adashunas v. Negley,276 in
which the plaintiff class sought injunctive relief requiring defendants to undertake
efforts to find out which school age children qualified for learning disability
services, as the defendants were required to do under federal statutes. The court in
Federal Class Action, 100 YALE LJ. 745, 745 (1990).273 See Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985); cf. Crown Cork
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1983) (tolling statute when class certification
denied).
274 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
2 75 Of course, Amchem itself has the same effect, by questioning whether notice sufficient
to satisfy Rule 23(c)(2) can possibly be provided to persons such as future spouses and children,
who have not yet come into a position where they can even be identified in theory. See
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231,2252 (1997).
276 626 F.2d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982) (rejecting certification of class of persons denied
energy assistance on grounds, inter alia, that identification of class members would be costly or
impossible).
1998] 1209
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
that case affirmed denial of class certification, stating that locating the children
entitled to relief would be difficult.277 Unless a class action can be brought in a
case like Adcshunas, the legal entitlement will remain unenforceable: as soon as
the class member is identified, that person's claim is mooted.2 78
As authorities have pointed out, the necessity for identification of class
members depends on the reason for identification. If in a given case the class's
interests can be protected without precise identification of class members, the
effort is not necessary.279 Then again, cases of this type should not be settled
without the effort to identify and provide adequate notice, or if they do settle, the
decree should not bind those class members who did not receive notice and the
opportunity to decline the offer.280 What the law ought to require is identification
sufficient to allow meaningful choice by class members who are being precluded
by the proposed settlement.
2. Obstacles to Settlement
It may be argued that the prospect of numerous opt outs along with the
possibility of a second class action brought by dissident class members will sour
too many settlements and make class members worse off than they were under
the Amchem approach, which allows settlements to go forward without the
difficulties of obtaining the consent of all class members. This point actually
contains two objections: first, the class identification requirement implicit in the
consent approach is impossible to meet; second, the identification requirement
can be met, but the settlement will not be attractive to the defendant unless all
identified class members are precluded by the offer. Of course, as noted above, in
some cases identification of class members will be impossible, or at least so
difficult as to prevent meaningful notice and opportunity for consent from being
277 See Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 603--04.
278 The upshot of Adashunas, of course, is that the class members had to be identified by
the named plaintiff in order to enforce a statutory entitlement to be identified by the defendant.
279 Thus, the often-quoted statement in the second edition of Moore's Federal Practice
needs to be read in its entirety: "[T]he membership of the class must be capable of
ascertainment under some objective standard so that the court may insure that the interests of
the class are adequately represented." 3B JAMEs WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACiCE
para. 23.04[1], at 104-05 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis added). If, under the court's disposition of
the case, the class members' interests are fully protected without the members being
individually identified until the distribution of relief, Rule 23 is satisfied. For Rule 23(b)(2)
cases, any requirement of individual identification is relaxed. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 119
F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that under Rule 23(b)(2), "precise definition is not as
important as it may be under other class certification rules").
280 As I have argued elsewhere, the same thing ought to be true for adjudications of class
actions that have binding effects, even in cases brought under Rule 23(b)(2). See Weber, supra
note 27, at 385-94.
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afforded.2 81 Those cases, however, will still be able to settle with regard to known
class members' claims. For the other class members, settlements are too
threatening to individual interests to be permitted to occur without consent; the
settlement will simply have to wait until the class members can be identified and
agree to the deal. Adjudication (or legislation) will be the only way to obtain
preclusive effect over claims of persons who cannot be identified. Effectively, the
proposal being advanced here gives plaintiffs the benefits of using class action
procedure in avoiding delay in recovery for those who accept the settlement. It
also gets those claimants' cases out of the way, diminishing the trial queue for
those who do not accept the settlement.
This conclusion leads to the second objection, that having too many (or even
a few) of the class members' claims unsettled will make the prospect of
settlement unattractive to defendants or cause them to offer less than what they
would offer if the settlement gave them global peace. One response to this
argument is that the problem is hardly worse than what Amchem permits.
Amchem was a settlement class action. It afforded the right to opt out of the
settlement to all class members whose identities could be obtained. The Amchem
Court did nothing to weaken this opt-out right. The Amchem approach does not
ensure global peace any more than the instant proposal does.
A second, more fundamental, response to the objection is that global peace is
greatly overrated even in cases unlike Amchem, in which the opt-out rights are
given at the time of class certification, rather than at the time of settlement, or in
which there are no opt-out rights because the case is one for equitable relief. For
class actions composed of small-damages claims, individual plaintiffs who do not
opt for the settlement will not recover more than the cost of litigation, and so are
unlikely to sue on -their own. If a dissident class action does obtain more in
settlement for its members than the original action did, that result is proof that the
first offer was not good enough.
Mass products or mass disaster actions composed of larger claims are worth
bringing on an individual basis, so the decision to opt out and bring an individual
suit is a more realistic one. It is doubtful, however, whether this fact will keep
defendants from settling, or keep class representatives from bringing cases
because they will anticipate that defendants will not settle. Every large defendant,
and every defendant's insurance company, considers a certain level of individual
personal injury suits to be a cost of doing business. The fact that the Amchem
defendants supported the settlement through an appeal to the Supreme Court
despite 87,000 opt outs demonstrates that not-fully-comprehensive settlements
remain attractive to defendants. 2 82
281 See supra text accompanying notes 275-80.
282 But see Vairo, supra note 17, at 127 ("[D]efendants particularly want global peace as a
consequence of settling a mass tort."). Of course, defendants benefit from complete preclusion
of all claims, but that does not contradict the fact that they offer attractive settlements without a
guarantee of it. See Rheingold, supra note 204, at 405 ("[I]f a small enough opt-out number is
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What defendants fear most is the "bet the company" or "bet the industry"
case, and some authorities argue that they have too great an incentive to settle
dubious claims when class actions amass claims to create such a situation2 83 But
the instant proposal makes "bet the company" cases no easier (though not much
more difficult) than they are under Amchem and the rest of existing class action
law. Class action plaintiffs' representatives will be as free as before to assemble
large-damages injury suits into mass tort actions, and defendants will have the
same freedom to make an offer of settlement in order to escape the squeeze
created by the cumulative weight of the claims. The instant proposal is far more
hospitable to early settlement of mass tort cases than the approach of some circuit
courts, which would bar any class treatment of a tort that is not "mature" enough
to establish a history of valuation of cases.284 Under the proposal I advance, early
settlement is perfectly permissible among defendants and those class members
who prefer not to speculate on the change in the value of the claim as facts are
developed and other cases elsewhere go to judgment.285 It is the parties' choice.
One way in which the proposal might be more beneficial to the interests of
defendants than the status quo is that it may give defendants the opportunity to
reserve the right to oppose class treatment should the settlement not be accepted
by a sufficient number of class members to meet the defendants' needs for
protection from further litigation. This feature follows from the allowance for an
early decision by class members whether to participate in the settlement. As noted
above, defendants are most concerned about the risks of loss of the company in a
class action that goes to trial.2 86 The current Rule's emphasis on early
determination of class status,2 8 7 with notice,288 and without any determination on
established-for example, no more than 5% of the cases-many defendants will agree [to a
settlement] as an expedient solution.").
283 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir.) (granting writ
of mandamus to overturn class action certification in blood-products case, stating that use of
class action procedure may create irresistible pressure for settlement in some cases), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
284 See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
285 Professor Mullenix contends that parties are unlikely to settle a mass tort class action
unless the tort is mature enough to have the basis for clear valuations. See Mullenix,
Constitutionality, supra note 19, at 632-33. In the main that may be correct, but there are
sufficient counter examples (the Silicone Gel case, for one) to consider the possibility that cases
may settle earlier. If consent is obtained, that possibility should not cause concern.
2 86 See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts,
39 ARiz. L. REV. 595, 603 (1997) ("Defendants ... would be extremely reluctant to agree to a
trial class even in conjunction with a settlement class for fear that the settlement class might fail,
leaving them in the untenable position of facing a trial class."); see also supra text
accompanying note 283 (discussing the "bet the company" class action case).
2 87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) ("As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
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the merits,289 clears the way for trial class actions without doing much either to
aid or to deter settlement classes. The proposal advanced here would permit
plaintiffs and defendants to work out a tentative class settlement and, if sufficient
consent is garnered, to go ahead to settlement with those who consent without
making any determination about the propriety of class treatment for the
remainder.
The consent approach does enhance the likelihood of having larger numbers
of individual actions left over after the bulk of the case settles, but that risk hardly
seems unfair to defendants. In fact the dynamics of court delay and congestion
may confer significant strategic advantages on defendants in confronting
individual cases under those circumstances.2 90 In any instance, the defendants
will always be able to obtain global peace, at a price, by taking the litigation
through to judgment or by sweetening the offer enough so that there are no
dissident plaintiff class members.
VI. THE FLAWS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Some alternative proposals to protect absent class members in the settlement
process rely either on the district courts or intervening class members. Still
another proposal would auction the class action to a laWyer or other individual,
distribute the proceeds to the class members, and permit the buyer to pursue the
case for maximum individual benefit. These approaches, however, do not achieve
the same benefits as a consent-based approach to settlement
A. Greater Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements
An approach to settlement that is different both from one based on consent
and from the one endorsed by the Amchem Court might rely on judicial scrutiny
of the settlement proposal itself. For example, the proponents of the settlement in
Amchein urged the Court to defer to the judgment made by the district court that
the settlement itself was fair and adequate, and accordingly to relax any other
basis of review of the class.291 The district court would scrutinize the agreement
perhaps rewriting it if it did not meet standards of fairness to all class members.
Various authorities argue for standards different from those currently employed,
maintained.'); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (noting the
Rule's "command" that class action determination be made promptly).
288 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring notice).
289 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 ("We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.").
290 See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
291 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248-49 (1997) (rejecting
position).
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but would nevertheless count on the district judge to protect the absent class
members by making a tough-minded determination of fairness of the proposed
settlement, or changing the settlement terms to make the pact fair.292
Judicial scrutiny of the terms of the bargain is of limited benefit, however.
The judicial function consists of evaluating evidence and legal argument to
determine the correct outcome for an alleged violation of rights brought to the
court for remedy.293 The problem is that the "correct" terms of a class settlement
are unknowable, for the acceptability of the deal will vary with each class
member.294 Even if the inquiry that the court makes under existing law were the
one that mattered, it is hard to imagine that any rule addressed to the judge would
lead to improved settlements. The only way to get enough information to be
completely accurate in comparing a proposed settlement with the litigated result is
to try the case. Courts already spend large amounts of time on class action cases
in relation to what they spend on other matters. 295 The district judges certainly
would not spend all that time unless they themselves believed that they were
affording meaningful review of settlements. It is hardly realistic to expect better
judicial scrutiny from a rule that shouts at the judges that they should do what
they already think they are doing.
An instructive analogy may be drawn to situations in which individuals make
an ordinary contract, either to settle a lawsuit296 or for any other purpose. If the
292 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 21, at 907; Resnik, supra note 90, at 858; Vairo, supra
note 17, at 161-62; Brian Wolfinan & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in
Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439,477-500 (1996).
293 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369
(1978).
294 The same problem exists with proposals that would enhance or render more neutral the
information provided to the judge, such as Professor Green's suggestion that courts appoint
special masters or guardians ad litem for some class members. See Green, supra note 19, at
803; see also Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Needfor a
Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MCH. L. REv. 308, 310-11 (1984)
(advancing proposal for appointment of guardian); cf Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson,
The Role of the Objector in Class Action Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors
Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 416-17 (1998)
(discussing the role of objector in class action settlement proceedings but acknowledging
availability of means to avoid scrutiny of settlements). The difficulty is not simply predicting
what the likely outcome of the case would be if it were tried; the difficulty is substituting one
individual's risk preferences for those of another.
2 95 See Willging et al., supra note 1, at 96-97 ("Based on case weights derived from [the
Federal Judicial Center's most recent] Time Study data, the average class action demands
considerably more judge time than the average civil case. We found this when we looked at the
data for all subject matter (nature-of-suit) categories combined and when we looked at the data
by nature-of-suit category.").
296 In McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985), the court noted that
federal courts' ordinary remedy for the failure of one of the parties to obey a settlement that had
led to dismissal of the case is simply to restore the case to the docket. Even in situations in
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contract fails because of mistake, fraud, or impossibility, the court does not
rewrite the contract to reflect a just or "correct" agreement. The proper remedy is
rescission of the contract.297 The court will reform the contract only when there
has been fraud or mistake in committing the agreement to paper, and then only to
reflect the actual agreement of the parties, not some optimally just or
constructively correct agreement.2 98 As a matter of general contract law, the
determination of what is a fair deal is always that of the parties. 299 The court
relies on the parties' own assessment of what constitutes adequate consideration
for the contract, not some abstract sense of what the agreement ought to
contain.300 Similarly, even under current class action settlement law, the role of
the court in evaluating the settlement is to give a simple yes or no on the
settlement, not to rewrite the bargain of the parties.30 1 The reason this approach is
not sufficient is that the agreement is not "of the parties" but of the defendant and
someone acting for the rest of the parties. Those individuals are entitled to make
their own individual decisions whether the bargain is acceptable.
B. Enhanced Intervention Rights
The ability to opt in, or to participate as an intervenor in the class action, is no
substitute for ability to refuse to accept a proposed settlement. Existing law
provides that Rule 23(b)(3) class members may participate in the action if they are
unhappy with class representation, 302 but courts have limited intervention to
which the court enforces the agreement, the court does not rewrite the agreement but enforces it
as written. See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (requiring
independent jurisdictional basis for federal court enforcement of settlement).
29 7 See DAN B. DOBBS, 2 LAW OF REMEDIEs § 9.5, at 615 (2d ed. 1993).
29 8 See id. ('If there is no agreement, or if the agreement itself is voidable for fraud, then
the remedy is traditionally one of rescission, not reformation.").
299 Of course, doctrines such as unconscionability, duress, or public policy might still bar
enforcement of the contract, but these considerations also lead to rescission, not to substantive
revision of the agreement by the court. See, e.g., id. § 10.1, at 634 ('The contract induced by
duress or undue influence may be cancelled... ").
30 0 See 2 PERiLO & BENDER, supra note 239, § 5.14, at 63 ('That which is bargained for
by the promisor and given in exchange for the promise of the other party is not prevented from
being consideration by virtue of the fact that what the promisee does or promises to do does not
have a market value equal to that promised by the promisor.").
301 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717,726-27 (1986) ("Rule 23(e) does not give the court
the power.., to modify a proposed consent decree and order its acceptance over either party's
objection."); Harris v. Pemsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("In considering the
proposed settlement, the court's role is a limited one. The court may either approve or
disapprove the settlement, it may not rewrite it.").
302 Rule 23(c)(2) provides that in any subdivision (b)(3) action, notice must advise class
members that "any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter
an appearance through counsel."
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applicants who can make a convincing showing of a likely contribution to the
litigation.303 Professor Wooley has argued that a class member's right to
participate as an intervenor should not be so restricted and that due process
demands the opportunity to have an individual status in the litigation if the class
member makes a timely application.304
However, as even Professor Wooley acknowledges, trial courts seeking to
keep cases from spiraling out of control have a near-irresistible urge to restrict the
level of participation of intervenors and to allow the class representatives to set
the litigation strategy for the entire class.305 It is hard to imagine that appellate
courts could effectively monitor such low visibility decisions whether discovery
the intervenor proposes to conduct or evidence that an intervenor proposes to
present would be duplicative of what the class representative has already done.
Whatever the verbal formula employed by courts, the most likely result is that
individual intervenors will be lost in the shuffle, unable to have their positions
heard and appreciated.
The judges have a point behind their reluctance to allow participation by too
many separate parties. The presence of too many litigants makes the mechanics of
litigating the case impossible 306 and threatens information overload. 307 Moreover,
in cases in which the class representatives work out a settlement with defendants,
it is doubtful that an intervenor would desire to carry out the litigation before a
judge who already deemed the settlement fair and adequate and who has a stake
in getting the matter off the docket.30 8 It is far better for the dissident class
member to exit and file a solo action, or if the dissident class members are
numerous enough, to file another class action composed of the persons
dissatisfied with the agreement. Despite the rhetorical appeal of the right to
participate, many tort claimants just want results.30 9 To some people,
303 See Wooley, supra note 21, at 603-04 & nn.148, 152 (collecting cases).
304 See id at 604-10.
305 See id. at 604; see also Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation
Conundrum, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 879, 890-94 (describing loss of individual litigant control in
consolidated cases).
306 See Kevin H. Hudson, Comment, Catch 23(b)(1)(B): The Dilemma of Using the
Mandatory Class Action to Resolve the Problem of the Mass Tort Case, 40 EMORY L.J. 665,
673 (1991).
307 See Brunet, supra note 52, at 720 ("[1]ntervention ... can greatly complicate litigation
by introducing new issues:").
308 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. CHu. L. REV. 337, 358 (1986) (describing incentives of lawyers to
appease judges conducting settlement negotiations by attempting to appear reasonable to the
judge); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 430-31 (1982)
(describing threat to impartiality when the judge has become invested in settlement
arrangements or wishes to clear the docket).
309 See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REv. 89,92-100 (discussing study of lawyer-client relations).
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participation in the process of litigation matters a great deal. To others, it matters
not at all. Still others are terrified of it. Individuals should be able to choose
participation or choose results, or even to trade one off for the other.
C. The Auction Proposal
Another major proposal that might be viewed as an alternative to the consent-
based approach is to auction the class action at the start, effectively settling the
class members' claims immediately after suit is filed.3 10 If the action is sold to a
lawyer, the claims are assigned to that individual for some fraction of their face
value.311 If the action is sold to the defendant, the claims are settled, again for
some fraction of the maximum they might bring in if litigated to judgment.312
Such an approach has promise in reducing the conflict of interest between class
counsel who are trying to maximize their remuneration per hour and class
members who are trying to maximize recovery. It faces inevitable difficulty in
civil rights313 or other suits where valuation is difficult and expenses properly
disproportionate to recovery314 and was initially proposed by Professors Macey
and Miller to be used in large-scale, small claims actions in which multiple class
suits have been filed.315 In small claims, non-civil rights class actions, if the
individual claimant is content with an auction procedure, there should be no
conflict between the approach proposed in this article and an auction.316 The
3 10 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1991).
311 See id at 106-07.
3 12 Seeid at 107-08.
313 See id. at 116.
314 In civil rights actions, the availability of attorneys' fees for the prevailing plaintiff is a
congressional recognition that vindicating the civil right is a public value and that litigants must
be able to undertake expenses that they cannot expect to recover out of the monetary result in
the case. See Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex
Litigation: A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal
Cases, 14 REV. LmG. 113,133-34 (1994).
315 See Macey & Miller, supra note 310, at 105. More recently, Macey and Miller have
suggested that the procedure might be adapted for use in mass tort lawsuits. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geofrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 909, 915-17 (1995); see also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941, 982-84 (1995) (considering merits of auction idea in
mass tort settings). In my view, the ability to opt out of such a settlement procedure would have
even greater importance in these large-claims cases.
316 Some commentators have been critical of the auction proposal. See, e.g., Weinstein,
supra note 18, at 527-31 (criticizing depersonalization and decrease of entrepreneurship;
suggesting that bidding may work as an initial screen, but citing risks of inadequate
investigation and collusion if the defendant participates). For a cautious, but generally favorable
review, see Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
1998] 1217
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
individual should, however, receive notice and the opportunity to opt out of the
deal (as, at one point, Macey and Miller suggest will be the case).317 If these
rights are not afforded, an auction procedure would defeat the values protected by
a consent requirement, including the dignity of individual decision making and
respect for individual risk preferences. 318
VII. LIMITS OF A CONSENT-BASED APPROACH
There are appropriate limits to the application of a consent-based approach to
the settlement of class actions. The consent requirement plainly should not be
applied to defeat cases like Adashunas v. Negley,3 19 where the only means to end
the violation of law is a subdivision (b)(2) class action on behalf of a class too
amorphous to be notified to obtain consent. 320 However, there should not be
preclusion for class members in that instance either, and there should not be any
binding settlement unless the class members somehow have been identified,
notified, and afforded a choice to settle or not.
Also, genuine subdivision (b)(1)(B) class actions should not fall under the
consent paradigm because of problems with persons holding out for more than a
proportional share of the limited fund.321 In those cases, however, the only
rational solution is subclassing and strict adherence to the typicality,
representative adequacy, and common question tests. Courts have upheld non-
opt-out class settlements when the parties have presented persuasive evidence that
the defendant is or is likely to become insolvent, and so all claims must be ratably
reduced.322 Class actions under (b)(1)(B) do not require individualized notice or
Lawsuits: A CriticalAnalysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423 (1993).
317 See Macey & Miller, supra note 310, at 107.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 194-202.
319 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980).
320 See supra text accompanying notes 276-80 (discussing Adashunas).
321 For an elaborate law-and-economics explanation of why fixed-pie cases are vulnerable
to holdout problems, see Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and
an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY LJ. 85 (1997). However,
the point was intuitively obvious to the first courts that used the class action device and to the
1966 drafters of Rule 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966).
322 For example, in In re Rio Hair Naturalizer Products Liability Litigation, No. MDL
1055, 1996 WL 780512 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1996), the court found that a manufacturer of a
defective hair product was insolvent and that the only assets available to satisfy the many likely
judgments against the defendant was an insurance policy. The policy limits were far below the
likely cumulative liability, and so the court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and
approved a proposed settlement providing limited recovery for all consumers who submitted
claims. See id. at *10-13. A similar case with somewhat less compelling evidence of the
defendant's inability to satisfy all potential judgments is Fanning v. Acromed Corp., 176 F.R.D.
158, 167-70 (E.D. Pa. 1997), involving claims against the manufacturer of orthopedic bone
screws said to be defective. A recent decision rejecting (b)(1)(B) certification for want of
1218 [Vol. 59:1155
CLASSACTIONSEYTLEMENT
the right to opt out, even when they settle. The failure to afford these protections
raises serious due process issues when, as would appear necessary, all class
members' rights have to be precluded in order to make the adjudication or
settlement work.323 I have previously suggested that individual notice and the
right to participate should be provided in similar situations under subdivision
(b)(2),324 and would suggest a similar solution in (b)(1)(B) cases. Given the
convenience and efficiency of modem bankruptcy procedure, legitimate questions
may be raised whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is ever appropriate for use in a mass tort
case.
325
In any instance, persuasive proof would need to be adduced that the fund is
limited before the courts should dispense with the requirement of individual
consent. A good example of a case in which the court found the existence of a
limited fund without adequate evidence for that conclusion is the Fifth Circuit's In
re Asbestos Litigation.326 There the court treated the assets the company and its
insurers set aside to settle the litigation as a fixed amount equivalent to a limited
fund. The fund was not in fact limited: all the assets of the company, which was
solvent, and its insurers, which were also solvent, were available to satisfy any
judgment against it, as were all future earnings.327 The court used the settlement's
set aside of certain assets under the settlement as a mechanism to bootstrap
limiting the liability to that amount.328 Class members who felt dissatisfied with
the settlement should have been permitted to reject it, as they would have been
had the case properly been designated as a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement class action,
or as they would have under the proposal advanced in this Article.329
evidence of a limited fund is Hum v. Dericks, 162 F.R.D. 628 (D. Haw. 1995), an action based
on the charge that a clinic implanted artificial ligaments of an unapproved type.
323 Making this point with regard to a subdivision (b)(1)(B) class involving institutional
relief at a state mental hospital is Caroline C. v. Johnson, 174 F.R.D. 452, 467 n.18 (D. Neb.
1996). The court indicated that subsequent claims for damages by absent class members would
not be precluded. See id.
324 See Weber, supra note 27, at 409-13.
325 See Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 823-24. As Professor Marcus notes, the bankruptcy
procedure is far superior because it protects the interests of creditors other than the mass tort
claimants and provides standards for resolving competing claims to the assets. See Marcus,
supra note 21, at 880-81. The Dalkon Shield case arose out of bankruptcy and involved a
limited fund for compensation of the unliquidated tort claims, made available by the buyer of
A.H. Robins' assets. See In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 709,720-21 (4th Cir. 1989).
326 90 F.3d 963, 982-86 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997), reaff'd, 134
F.3d 668,669 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. grantedsub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339
(1998).
3 27 See 134 F.3d at 671-72 (Smith, J., dissenting). There were disputes over coverage as
well as underlying liability.
32 8 See id
329 As noted above, the proposal in this Article would impose safeguards of disclosure
beyond those currently required in Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes, working an improvement
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Finally, even a consent-based approach to class action settlement may not
solve all of the agency problems that exist between the absent class members and
the class attorney. As numerous authorities have pointed out, the prevailing fee
arrangements for class attorneys have perverse effects, usually awarding lawyers
far more per hour for settling the case inexpensively rather than pursuing the
matter to litigation to obtain a higher reward. Various proposals to eliminate those
problems include incentives, such as an increasing share of recovery for the
attorney with the higher the recovery for the class,330 and disincentives, such as
limiting the share of recovery for any lawyer or firm to no more than the share of
the recovery that the lawyer or firm would receive from seeing the case through to
judgment.331 Still another proposal suggests having the class members with the
largest individual claims take on a special role of monitoring the class lawyer.332
None of these proposals is incompatible with the consent-based approach to
settlement suggested here. Their proponents contend that they will increase the
size of the settlement offers that are transmitted to the class, though critics of the
proposals argue that the incentives will eliminate the chances of settlement
altogether.333
VII. CONCLUSION
A consent-based approach to the settlement of class actions is the only way to
even in cases in which the opt-out choice currently operates as a means of securing consent (or
refusal) to class action settlement.
3 30 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 697 (1986). The subject of regulation of attorneys' fees in mass torts
cases is canvassed in Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts:
Access, Risk and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Workfor Individuals
and Collectives of Clients, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 (1998).
331 See Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too
Little, 48 HAsTINGS L.J. 479, 482-85 (1997) [hereinafter Asymmetric Rewards]; see also Bruce
L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1429,
1450-75 (1997) (justifying fee regulation and proposing novel approach).
3 32 The proposal applies to securities class actions and discusses the special role that the
larger institutional investors can play in supervising the attorney for the class. See Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 245, at 2110-12.
333 In particular, the Hay proposal would all but eliminate classes composed of individuals
who might file suit in the future. I would advocate such a step only in those instances in which
the individuals could not be identified and notified adequately. The proposal eliminates those
classes by disallowing any fee to the lawyer that is greater than that the lawyer would receive if
the case went to judgment. As he notes, there is little likelihood that more than a handful of the
people who have not yet contemplated suit would choose that particular lawyer and pay his or
her fee if they eventually filed suit and litigated their cases to judgment, so the maximum fee for
litigating the class action to settlement would be minuscule. See Hay, Asymmetric Rewards,
supra note 331, at 498.
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respond to the fact that classes are composed of individual litigants, with their
own interests and their own appetites for recovery and for risk. The Amchem
approach to the settlement of class actions, by drawing the inquiry into abstract
issues of common question predominance and representative adequacy, threatens
the usefulness of class action procedure and the benefits of class action settlement
in many cases.
Offering each class member the option to accept or reject a settlement will
permit courts to continue to pursue valuable settlements while applying
predominance and representative adequacy tests flexibly. At the same time, it will
provide class members what they currently lack- individual choice, the most
important component of any. contract to settle a legal claim in the course of
ordinary litigation.

